Trade Facilitation in the Multilateral Trading System - An Analysis of the Doha Round Negotiations on Trade Facilitation by Sheikhan, Pegah
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade Facilitation in the Multilateral Trading System 
- An Analysis of the Doha Round Negotiations on Trade Facilitation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Law 
School of Economics and Commercial Law 
University of Gothenburg 
 
Pegah Sheikhan 
 
LL.M program 
Master Thesis 30 hp 
Supervisor: Professor Per Cramér 
Autumn 2008 
  2 
ABSTRACT 
 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) as the world trading system is at a “cross roads”. 
Following the failure of ministers to reach an agreement on the WTO negotiations at their 
meeting in Geneva in July 2008, the WTO Members have retreated for serious reflection on 
the continued efforts to conclude the Doha Round. WTO Members, NGOs and scholars have 
raised concerns that if the Doha Round is not concluded then the WTO will exhaust its 
legitimacy and lead to a myriad of unequal and diverse bilateral or regional trade agreements. 
 
International studies confirm that trade facilitation, by means of improving administrative 
trading processes and harmonizing regulations and laws, can result in greater economic 
growth than tariff reductions that are on the negotiation table. In light of these findings, those 
favoring bilateralism argue that trade facilitation should move forward without waiting for a 
multilateral agreement. However, the multilateral trade system offers an institutional platform, 
which no other international organization or its bilateral counterparts can provide. Regardless 
of its shortcomings, the WTO still has a strong support among its members and many of them 
are taking initiatives to resume the Doha Round. Proponents for a multilateral system also 
argue that great problems can arise when important trade topics, like trade facilitation, under 
the WTO framework are taken from the multilateral trade agenda and settled in bilateral 
agreements.   
 
Trade facilitation, regulated under Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT, is not a divisive 
subject in the WTO, being added only in 2004. Still, trade facilitation has widely been 
recognized as bringing benefits to the WTO Members, particularly to developing countries, 
and has caused relatively few disagreements between the WTO Members. However, the 
special and differential treatment and the technical assistance that are being offered to the 
developed countries in order to ease the implementation process, have been and will continue 
to be the difficult issues to be settled in future negotiations. These implementation issues, that 
entail additional negotiation time and political effort, become more complex since the aid 
instruments have the nature of soft law. The main reason for the state of affairs is that many 
developing countries lack the economical and administrative platforms to implement trade 
facilitation, and consequently they require guarantees that go beyond non-binding 
commitments.        
 
Against this background, the aim of this thesis is - besides scrutinizing the institutional, 
judicial and political implications and benefits of trade facilitation - to examine if there are 
any more efficient implementation alternatives than the multilateral approach. The main 
conclusion of this thesis is that although trade facilitation will result in some implications for 
the developing countries the advantages exceed the disadvantages. Moreover, the WTO even 
with its democratic deficit and institutional shortcomings is the preeminent legal institution to 
implement trade facilitation. This thesis recognizes the difficulties ahead for the multilateral 
trading system, but believes the Doha Round in the near future will be resumed and hopefully 
results in an agreement, which not only launches trade facilitation, but also restores WTO’s 
legitimacy as an international trading system.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Current Trends 
In the past 60 years, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and trade liberalization have had 
an important role in achieving economic revenues, business opportunities and employment 
safeguard generally in the world. Developing countries, on the other hand, often lack the 
necessary capacity to manage their role in international institutions, their production capacity 
is low and many of them are trapped in unbalanced trade agreements. However, free trade has 
come a long way from David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages and it has become 
increasingly clear a more balanced trade is needed for economical growth, development and 
peace. Trade facilitation regulated under Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT, can if correctly 
implemented becomes the balanced and fair tool for economic growth and development that 
the world community needs.    
 
It is not only tariffs and other market-access barriers that limit international trade, but also 
inefficient and outdated border administrative and judicial procedures have contributed to the 
constraints. In fact, trade facilitation which seeks to solve inefficient administrative and 
judicial procedures, has possibly the biggest potential for developing countries in the Doha 
Round, but it is the least talked about. Moreover, trade facilitation can generate more 
economical growth than tariff reductions. The aim of the current negotiations on trade 
facilitation in the Doha Round is to promote improvements on the judicial and administrative 
international trade procedures.  
 
The general opinion before the Ministerial meeting in Geneva, July 2008, was that if the 
negotiations stagnated it would be the starting point of the termination of the Multilateral 
Trading System (MTS). However, although the collapse of the Doha Round has not affected 
the world trade notably the situation is sensitive. The Doha Round has missed one deadline 
after the other and now the interruption of the negotiations and the prospect of resumed talks 
collide with outbreak of the subprime mortgage financial crisis a long with a new era of the 
American and European administrations, which might affect both the time schedule and the 
outcome of the Round.  
 
After the collapse in Geneva, there is a general discussion concerning regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) role in international trade. The 
approach of turning to bilateralism to implement trade facilitation in specific is argued to be 
more prosperous than wasting time on whether or not a successful agreement can be reached 
under the Doha round. When bilateral agreements are being discussed, a division has to be 
made between a general concern that bilateral agreements will substitute the multilateral 
system if the Doha Round fails and the role of bilateral agreements on trade facilitation. Both 
scenarios are examined in this thesis with emphasize on RTAs consequences on trade 
facilitation. However, there is another discourse stating the importance of multilateral trade 
agreements under an international organization. The interesting question is thus, which 
discourse, if any, is the most appropriate for implementing trade facilitation? 
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During the last years every now and then, closely linked to the Doha Rounds failures, 
politicians and economists1 argue that trade facilitation should shift from a negotiation plan to  
a “development plan” or “development package” together with Aid for Trade.2 The argument 
is that trade facilitation is a positive aspect of the Doha negotiations but that it has been stuck 
because of lack of progress in other areas. Since trade facilitation is said to cut costs of trade 
far in excess of those imposed by tariffs and other trade barriers, it is argued that there is no 
point in waiting for an overall Doha agreement. Instead, efforts should be made to find an 
agreement on trade facilitation. This is another interesting aspect concerning trade facilitation 
as an independent topic in relation to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and worth 
examining along with other alternative approaches, such as bilateral and plurilateral 
agreements, in relation to a multilateral agreement.   
 
1.2 Definition of the Main Issues of Trade Facilitation  
The importance of trade facilitation as a tool for economic development is especially vital for 
economic growth for least developing countries (LDCs), developing countries and smaller 
developed countries. The  main reasons for this is the large increase in international trade, the 
explosive IT-development, which has lead to faster, cheaper and more efficient transport 
systems (such as Just in Time-management and e-business), and the development in the 
nature of internationally trade goods going from complete goods towards sub-assembled 
products in different countries.  
 
The WTO defines trade facilitation as “the simplification and harmonization of international 
trade procedures” where international trade procedures are defined as the “activities, practices, 
and formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating and processing data 
required for the movement of goods in international trade.” 3 To this end, the main objectives 
for trade facilitation, according to the WTO, are in summary:   
 
(a) To simplify formalities and procedures related to import, export and transit of goods 
(b) To harmonize applicable regulations and laws 
(c) To standardize and integrate definitions as well as requirements of information, the 
use of information and communication technologies.4     
 
1.3 Definition of the International Trading Parties 
The WTO does not have any definitions regarding the categories but uses international 
established definitions. Developed countries are countries with a high income per capita, 
strong human capacity and high GDP. The category of newly industrializing country (NIC) is 
an economic classification on a country that has made a switch from agricultural to 
manufacturing economy, fosters large national corporations and is recipients of strong capital 
investment from foreign investors.  
 
                                                          
1
 World Bank President Robert Zoellick and the recent former EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson are 
both strong advocates for this approach. For more information see Washington Trade Daily, 1 October 2008, 
pp1-3. 
2
 See section 3.5.2. 
3
 Cosgrove-Sacks et al, Trade Facilitation: the Challenges for Growth and Development, p 10. 
4
 As identified by the participants at the WTO Symposium on Trade Facilitation in March 1998, see ”WTO 
Trade Facilitation Symposium – report by the Secretariat.”  
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The WTO recognizes as LDCs those countries, which have been designated as such by the 
UN. This category of States is deemed highly disadvantaged in their development process, 
facing low income, weak human asset and economic vulnerability. Out of the current 50 
LDCs on the UN list, 32 of them have to date become WTO members.5 Developing countries 
in the WTO are based on self-selection although this is not necessarily automatically accepted 
in all WTO bodies. Another category land-locked developing country (LLDC), exist under 
even harsher conditions with poor physical infrastructure, weak productive capacities, small 
domestic markets, and limited access to world markets. This group especially will get 
economical advantages through the success of trade facilitation.  
 
1.4 Theoretical Approaches 
This thesis examines the main discourse in the field of trade facilitation from the WTO 
Members’ perspective, especially from the developing countries’ standpoint, simply because 
they are the main benefiters of trade improvements and those who face difficult 
implementation and enforcement issues.  
 
When studying International Trade Law, there are mainly two discourses regarding the 
multilateral trading system (MTS) and its raison d'être that are imperative to bear in mind. On 
one hand, there is the multilateral discourse that encourages cooperation between states under 
the WTO and on the other hand, there is the bilateral discourse that promotes various forms of 
bilateral agreements as an alternative.6 Regarding trade facilitation, the multilateralists usually 
argue that the WTO is the best-positioned organization to administer, implement and enforce 
trade facilitation. Since the nature of trade facilitation is to harmonize juridical and 
administrative procedures, the framework should be of an international magnitude and of 
binding nature. The bilateralists, on the other hand, argue that RTAs or PTAs are more 
appropriate to handle the specific needs of every country or region, and that the scope of the 
free trade agreement can be wider but also more efficient since governments usually express 
additional political will when they have a more active role.7 
 
Bilateralists argue that RTAs collaborate instead of clash with the WTO and that RTAs are a 
sign of the MTS’s shortcomings. It is true that RTAs are not contradictory to WTO law, 
however, their judicial status is becoming more complicated and has become subject for 
different academic discourses. This thesis is not going to examine the discourses any further 
while it settles to state that the new movement seem to be of a somewhat anarchical situation - 
a “bowl of spaghetti” to quote the famous economist Jagdish Bhagwati.  Consequently, it is 
not the WTO, which determines and enforces the legitimacy of the RTAs, but it is the RTAs 
themselves, which determine the degree of their adherence to WTO law. It is not argued that 
the WTO is flawless, however, the fundamental question is whether multilateralism can 
effectively temper the negative effects of power politics better than bilateral agreements.  
 
Another theoretical approach influencing the discourse of International Trade Law is the 
judicial force behind hard law and soft law and their interaction in international governance. 
                                                          
5
 http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3618&lang=1. [23.10.08 at 3:14]. 
6
 Kreuger, The WTO as an International Organization, pp. 334-343.   
7
 The multilateral discourse is often represented by LDCs, NGOs, and, scholars representing a more 
Keynesianism approach. See de Vylder et al, The Least Developed Countries and World Trade, Sida Studies no 
5, Sweden, 2001, for a summarization of the discourse. The bilateral discourse is usually represented by neo-
liberals, traditionally the U.S. and some Western European countries, but mainly by scholars of the neoclassical 
school of thought. See this recognized report for deeper comprehension of the discourse; Ikenson, While Doha 
Sleeps – Securing Economic Growth through Trade Facilitation, Center for Trade Policy No 37, the US, 2008.    
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Hard law generally refers to legal obligations of a formally binding nature and soft law to law 
that is not formally binding but may nonetheless exercise significant influence on the 
contracting parties’ behaviour. Soft law norms can strengthen hard WTO law, by 
supplementing it or by filling gaps in the law. It can also make WTO law more accessible and 
easier to comprehend in offering solutions to seemingly intractable problems. However, soft 
law can be in opposition to hard law and degenerate its aims. Against this background, the 
question is if the most prominent soft law instruments in the field of trade facilitation can 
complement, oppose and/or even become an alternative to WTO law.8  
 
1.5 Purpose 
Although Sweden is a strong advocator for trade facilitation, few information sources 
summarize the progress of trade facilitation in the MTS through an interdisciplinary 
perspective.9 The aim of this thesis is thus to examine and analyze the institutional, judicial 
and political advantages and disadvantages of implementing trade facilitation under the WTO 
mainly for those with little or no prior knowledge of the subject. However, references are 
made throughout the thesis to reports, studies and publications for further revision on the 
subject.  
 
The primary questions examined are of three dimensions:  
 
I) The Institutional Dimension  
Is the WTO the accurate organization to continue developing and 
implementing trade facilitation? 
The WTO, as a multilateral trading institution itself, will be examined a 
long with other international organizations. In order to provide a deeper 
understanding of trade facilitation’s position in the WTO, the 
negotiations regarding trade facilitation are being studied in relation to 
key topics that have been discussed at the Ministerial Conferences. 
 
II) The Judicial Dimension  
Is the legal framework of the WTO adequate for trade facilitation or are 
there alternatives that are more suitable? 
Another aim, besides explaining the provisions regulating trade 
facilitation, is to describe some of the implementation proposal that have 
influenced the negotiations in the Doha Round. A closer examination is 
made of the judicial rights and duties, a long with the possible 
implications that might arise when implementing trade facilitation. The 
interaction between hard and soft law in the field of trade facilitation is 
scrutinized in addition to alternative approaches to the implementation 
issue, which are examined in relation to the multilateral system.  
 
III) The Policy Dimension 
What are the benefits and implications of implementing trade facilitation 
for the WTO Members, especially the LDCs? 
                                                          
8
 Shaffer et al, How Hard and Soft Law Interact in International Regulatory Governance: Alternatives, 
Complements and Antagonists, Society of International Economic Law Inaugural Conference 2008 Paper.  
9
 However, the Swedish National Board of Trade has published several publications on the progress of trade 
facilitation in the EU and the WTO. For more information, see www.kommers.se. 
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Trade facilitation, although it can generate benefits, means essential 
adjustments in the judicial and administrative trade systems of the 
developing countries. Although, the grade of the implications varies for 
the individual developing countries depending on their financial and 
political situation, the question is whether the advantages exceed the 
disadvantages in practice.  
                                    
1.6 Method and Material  
In an attempt to keep the focus on trade facilitation in the Doha Round, international trade law 
has been the primary source in this thesis, disregarding the examination of regional 
regulations due to the space limitation. Thus, a traditional legal dogmatic approach has been 
used and the main sources have been legal text, official WTO documentations, WTO case law 
and legal doctrine.  
 
Since the nature of this thesis is interdisciplinary, second-hand sources in the field of 
economy and policy have also been revised. References have been made to studies completed 
by the WTO and the World Bank simply because they have the most accurate and reliable 
data. This thesis relies on the thoroughness and correctness of the scholars and observers that 
have debated trade facilitation and the WTO in books and articles throughout the years. 
Additionally, information gained from interviews and seminars held at various think tanks 
during my internship at the Swedish Embassy in Washington D.C. as well as interviews 
carried out afterwards have served as sources in order to explicate the different dimension of 
trade facilitation.  
 
Each chapter starts with a descriptive part of the issues concerned and finishes with the 
writer’s conclusions. However, a clear distinction between descriptive and analytic parts is 
consciously not obtained when it could enhance reading comprehension. Standpoints of the 
WTO Members, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and scholars representing the 
different discourses are continuously discussed and evaluated with the ambition to uphold 
objectivity when assessing the opposing sides.  
 
1.7 Disposition 
The questions directing this thesis are also the structure of the thesis, dividing it in 
institutional, judicial and policy analysis of trade facilitation in the Doha Round. The first 
Chapter starts with a historical background of the creation of the WTO. To understand the 
institutional structures of the WTO essentials fact about the Organization in terms of the 
relevant decision-making bodies and mechanisms of enforcement are briefly studied. The rest 
of the Chapter concentrates on decomposing the outcomes of the Ministerial Conferences in 
relation to the progress trade facilitation have made under the negotiations. This is carried out 
as an attempt to scrutinize the possible success of trade facilitation in future negotiations. 
The second Chapter examines the legal texts and case law of Articles V, VIII and X of the 
GATT, which regulates trade facilitation. The accurate proposals regarding modalities, 
submitted by the WTO Members, are also studied. General issues on the subject of technical 
assistance, SDT and DSM are being scrutinized in order to understand the extension of rights 
and duties connected to trade facilitation for developing countries and LDCs.  
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The third Chapter focuses on the economical and political benefits that trade facilitation can 
produce such as economical growth, promotion of democratic institutions, and international 
collaboration between organizations and governments. In addition, implications like 
administrative corruption, security in the supply chain and environmental concerns are being 
examined. This thesis finishes with final remarks of the writer.  
 
Due to the complex nature of the modalities under negotiation, the submitted proposals and 
the Members States behind the initiatives are summarized in the appendix, in order to give the 
reader a fundamental knowledge of the areas central for trade facilitation.  
 
1.8 Delimitations 
First, the aim of this thesis is to study the harmonization of custom formalities in the relevant 
GATT Articles; put differently, how trade facilitation can “cut through the red tape”. 10 
Although, trade facilitation harmonize the administrative and logistical procedures of 
international trade it should not be mistaken for the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement 
(TBT). The TBT, which standardize product requirements by e.g. certification, inspection and 
labelling in order to ensure that regulations and standard procedures do not create unnecessary 
obstacles to trade, is thus outside the scope of this thesis.  
   
This thesis recognizes the existence of other decisive issues than trade facilitation, e.g. 
agriculture or NAMA that will determine the outcome of the Doha Round, but it put emphasis 
on trade facilitation as the catalyst it can be for international trade and development.   
 
Due to the limited scope of this thesis, no case studies have been examined to calculate the 
potential gains that LDCs have made by implementing various trade facilitation measures. 
Only when it is deemed necessary specific cases are brought to the reader’s attention. 
 
Regional and national initiatives are important; however, since they are not of international 
character their contribution is limited. Regional incentives, e.g. SOLVIT, and existing WTO 
agreements - such as Agreement on Customs Valuation, Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures and Agreement on TBTs - which are in some parts relevant for trade facilitation, 
are excluded from the scope of this thesis.11  
                                                          
10
 This is a concept frequently exploited when trade facilitation is under discussion since the red tape commonly 
was used to tie official papers. The red tape was, and perhaps still is, an expression of the inflexible application 
of regulations and routines, causing delays and obstacles in getting business done. 
11
 See National Board of Trade’s publication Trade facilitation and Swedish experiences, 2008, p 19, for further 
reading. 
   
  13 
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF TRADE 
FACILITATION 
 
Several international organizations have implemented trade facilitation under various forms 
since the 1960s. The WTO is the largest organization of them all, representing the majority of 
the economies of the world, and thus argued to be the best integral institution to organize the 
necessary work for trade facilitation. However, since some economists and scholars have 
argued that international efforts should be made away from the MTS, it is of interest to 
examine whether there is an equivalent international organizational that can implement trade 
facilitation in the same extent as the WTO. Moreover, in order to understand the position of 
trade facilitation in the international trade system a historical background and assessment of 
the WTO as an institution is necessary. 
 
2.1 Trade Facilitation and International Organizations 
Although, trade facilitation negotiations within WTO’s framework are the largest of its kind, 
there are two other major multilateral international agreements currently existing regarding 
trade facilitation. These are two established conventions; the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe’s (UNECE) Convention on the International Transport of Goods 
Under Cover of TIR Carnets12 and the World Custom Organization’s (WCO) Revised Kyoto 
Convention. Both Conventions have influenced the existing proposals made by the WTO 
Members on trade facilitation modalities.13 Although the Conventions have influenced the 
negotiation work in the WTO they have shortcomings and limitations. Other organizations 
that play an increasingly important role in trade facilitation are the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC). ICC that works closely with the WCO, WTO and other international 
organizations has published both recommendations and guidelines. Another active 
organization is International Maritime Organization (IMO), which mainly address trade 
facilitation and safety in the maritime field. However, only the first two are discussed here as 
regards to their extensive acceptance as trade facilitation promoters.  
 
2.1.1 Trade Facilitation and the United Nations  
Many of UN’s bodies are involved directly or indirectly in trade facilitation. Two of  the most 
established being United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
UNECE.  UNCTAD was established in 1964 as a permanent intergovernmental body with the 
goal to maximize the trade, investment and development opportunities of developing 
countries by providing technical assistance a long with research and policy analysis. 
UNCTAD has of today, 193 members. In April 2003, UNCTAD and WTO signed a 
                                                          
12
 Carnets are international customs documents that simplify customs procedures for the temporary importation 
of various types of goods. 
13
 WCO and UNCTAD, but not UNECE, have direct mandate under the WTO July package 2004, para 8, to 
collaborate with the WTO on the technical assistance and capacity building issues. Together with IMF and 
OECD they constitute the well-known Annex D organizations.   
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Memorandum of Understanding providing for cooperation and consultations on their 
technical assistance activities.14 
 
Although, UNECE is a regional commission - the four other regional commissions also 
working with trade facilitation - the UNECE’s TIR Convention is the oldest and most 
successful of existing multilateral trade facilitation agreements. The TIR Convention provides 
the legal basis for expediting the international movement of goods by road transport in 
Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. The current TIR Convention came 
into force in 1978 and has 68 contracting parties as of today. 15 
 
The TIR Convention was devised to minimize delays and expenses when goods transit the 
territory of other nations by road by providing transit countries with required guarantees to 
cover the custom duties and taxes at risk. The TIR Conventions key elements to solve the 
duplicated measures are the application of risk management, simplified procedures for 
qualified traders and the availability of customs guarantees, which have proved successful in 
the facilitation of road transport. 16 Although the TIR Convention has been expanding, it is of 
limited scope since it solitary regulates road transport procedures. Furthermore, it is currently 
not used in LLCDs, nor or does it have an efficient dispute settlement system, which makes 
the Convention unproductive if there is a case of non-compliance. 17  
 
2.1.2 Trade Facilitation and the World Customs Organization   
The WCO, developed the International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization 
of Customs Procedures, known as the Kyoto Convention, which entered into force in 1974. 
However, radical revisions to the Convention were required to reflect modern customs 
administration practices, why revisions to the Convention were adopted in 1999. The WCO 
has today has 175 Members and as of September 2007, 54 countries have acceded to the 
Convention with members including both developed countries and NICs. Nevertheless, the 
same issues exist like the TIR convention; most developing and LCDs have not acceded the 
soft law instrument.18 This having been said, the WTO has acknowledged many of the basic 
principles in its frame work for trade facilitation.   
 
The Revised Kyoto Convention sets forth some “general principles”. First, the provisions 
must apply to customs procedures and practices. Customs formalities must be specified in 
national legislation and be as uncomplicated as possible. Moreover, customs must maintain 
formal consultative relationships to increase cooperation and facilitate the most effective 
methods of work ethics. Other important provisions are that customs control systems must 
include audit-based controls and that customs must ensure that all relevant information is 
readily available to any interested person.19 
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Although, the Convention has been effective and given concrete result as a tool for trade 
facilitation it is narrow for mainly three reasons. First, the Kyoto Convention was primarily 
the work of developed countries’ customs administrations. Approximately two-thirds of the 
54 countries that have acceded to the Kyoto Convention are, as mentioned developed 
countries or emerging countries.  Therefore, there has been an inadequate political support for 
accession to the Kyoto Convention in most LDCs. Second, in contrast to the WTO no binding 
dispute resolution mechanism exists in the Kyoto Convention. Third, the extensive TA/CB 
necessary for many developing countries to implement cannot be provided by the WCO. After 
all, WCO is a diminutive international organization of customs specialists with an incredibly 
limited budget and staff.20  
 
2.2 World Trade Organization   
The WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was 
established after World War II in the wake of other new multilateral institutions known as the 
Bretton Woods institutions; the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The 
international institution for trade, the International Trade Organization (ITO), was 
successfully completed 1948. The same year the negotiations on the Havana Charter - that 
was to guide the basic rules for international trade and other international economic matters - 
started. The Havana Charter, however, never de facto became operational. The countries 
feared that the organization would devolve into a large bureaucracy that would in the end 
have institutionalized and sanctioned state regulation of international commerce. As 
governments negotiated the ITO, 15 negotiating states began parallel negotiations for General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). When the ITO failed in 1950, GATT became the 
focus for international governmental cooperation on trade matters.21 
 
GATT entered into force 1 January 1948, when the 23 participating countries signed the 
agreement. From 1948 to 1994, a strong MTS was developed through “rounds” of trade 
negotiations. In the early years, the GATT rounds concentrated on further reducing tariffs 
whereas tariff reductions was considered to be the most powerful trade barrier. Then, the 
Kennedy Round in the mid-sixties other issues such as anti-dumping and development issues 
became more important. The Tokyo Round during the seventies was the first major attempt to 
tackle trade barriers that do not take the form of tariffs but its achievements were limited. 22  
 
Due to its institutional structure where as GATT was a part of a charter with no solid 
regulations concerning organization, GATT needed to be reformed. That effort resulted in the 
Uruguay Round and the creation of WTO. The WTO entered into force on the 1 January 1995 
and replaced GATT as the international multilateral trade organization. Up to this date, the 
organization has 153 Members and 30 observer governments. The GATT still exists as the 
WTO's umbrella treaty for trade in goods, as the revised GATT 1994, distinct from the 
original agreement 1947. The WTO Agreement, serves as an umbrella agreement while 
annexed are the agreements on goods, services and intellectual property, dispute settlement, 
trade policy review mechanism and the plurilateral agreements. 23  One of the major 
organizational improvements is the fact that the WTO framework ensures a “single 
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undertaking approach” - thus, membership in the WTO entails accepting all the results of the 
rounds without exception.24 
  
2.2.1 Principles of the World Trade Organization 
The GATT was created on a limited number of principles and objectives, which are essential 
to the application of the different trade areas under the DDA. In essence, these are most-
favoured-nation treatment (MFN), national treatment and reciprocity. Article I of the GATT, 
states that the MFN-treatment means that every time a Contracting Party lowers a trade 
barrier or opens up a market, the Contracting Party has to do so for the same goods or services 
from all its trading partners. However, the MFN principle is subject to some important 
exceptions. The most important exception, Article XXIV of the GATT, permits the formation 
of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). It is under 
the provision that the custom unions EU and North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) find their legitimacy.25 PTAs are usually among few states while RTAs cover entire 
regions.  
 
The principle of National Treatment set out in Article III of the GATT, addresses another 
form of discrimination, namely where a Contracting Party adopts internal or domestic 
regulation or requirement designed to favor its domestic products vis á vis foreign producers 
of a given product. The rule is very wide in scope as it applies to all kinds of taxes and other 
internal charges. However, the importance of the provision is limited for trade facilitation 
since custom duties and other border measures are outside the scope of the provision.26  
 
The most central provision for the Doha Round is the principle of reciprocity. Although 
reciprocity as a legal concept has not been defined by the Contracting Parties, it is a 
fundamental principle occupying a central position in the General Agreement.27 However, 
under Article XXVI:8 of the GATT there is an amendment in favor of developing countries 
regarding the principle of reciprocity of concessions. It is stated, “the developed contracting 
parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to 
reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting 
parties.”28  
 
The Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) that has come to influence especially the trade 
facilitation negotiations in the Doha Round, is in some part based on the theory of 
reciprocity.29 The “enabling clause” was adopted under GATT in 1979 in order to permit 
trading preferences targeted at developing and least developed countries, which would 
otherwise violate Article I of the GATT. It allows developing countries to enter into 
agreements which may be non-reciprocal, or cover a very limited range of products, which 
otherwise would have contravene the GATT. SDT takes the form of special provisions in 
agreements giving developing countries special rights such as longer time periods of 
implementation and lower tariff cuts in some products.30  
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2.2.2 The Formal Structure of the World Trade Organization 
The WTO is a diverse organization with no permanent authority, e.g. the Security Council in 
the UN system. On the contrary, the Ministerial Conference, which is the highest authority in 
the WTO, is participated by all the WTO Members.31 Through its Ministerial Declarations, 
the content of the Ministerial Conferences that all Members States have to accept is stated. 
The next important level is the General Council, which is responsible for the work in between 
the Ministerial Conferences. The General Council consists according to the WTO Agreement 
of three bodies and they consist of all WTO Members: the General Council, the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) and the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB). They report to the 
Ministerial Conference and the General Council acts on behalf of the Ministerial Conference 
on all WTO affairs. The third level consist of three more councils, represented by all WTO 
Members, each handling a different broad area of trade.32 As regards trade facilitation, the 
Council for Trade in Goods (Goods Council) is responsible for the trade area and reports to 
the General Council. On this level, the WTO offers its Members transparency and democratic 
representation within the institutional framework.   
 
The rounds, that position the trade agenda for numerous years, offer as many advantages as 
disadvantages. Due to the political and economical issues that are in stake for the WTO 
Members the rounds ends up in delays in negotiation and deadlocks. However, the time 
consuming and expensive trade rounds can have an advantage when it comes to creating 
incentives for the WTO. They offer a package approach that can sometimes be more fruitful 
than negotiations on a single issue while the participants can seek and secure advantages 
across a wide range of issues and through trade-offs.33 
 
Settling disputes is the responsibility of the DSB, which consists of all WTO members. The 
DSB has the sole authority to consider a possible breach under the WTO Agreement, to 
accept or reject the panels’ findings or the results of an appeal to the Appellate Body (AB), 
and it has the power to authorize retaliation when a country does not comply with a ruling.34 
In the WTO system there is another control system, Trade Policy Review (TPR), which role is 
to increase transparency regarding the WTO Members trade policies or laws through 
information collection, reassess and reports.35 
 
2.2.3 The Informal Structure of the World Trade Organization 
There is, however, an informal decision culture within the WTO. One phenomenon where the 
disapproval is widespread is the “Green Room” meetings.36 The Green Rooms meetings are 
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the forums for the major trade powers to agree among themselves so that they together can 
apply pressure on the other WTO Members to accept their proposals. Green Rooms meetings 
have been criticized for not being transparent enough while there has been lack of information 
to the other WTO Members that have nor been participating and that they have few 
opportunities to provide with alternative opinions and information. 37  Those favoring the 
system argue that through the formed coalitions WTO Members are being represented, whilst 
getting information by those representatives that are attending the meetings. Moreover, in the 
end, the decisions have to be taken by all WTO Members and it is almost impossible to 
achieve consensus on hard-solved issues among all 153 Members.38 After years of criticism, 
the WTO has made more efforts for securing transparency and disclosure although it has a 
long way to become more democratic.  
 
In the same rate as the WTO expands, the alliances in the WTO increases, reflecting the 
broader spectrum of bargaining power in the WTO. The most powerful group has traditionally 
been the “Quad” represented by the U.S., the EU, Canada and Japan. The remaining WTO 
Members have organized themselves in various groups. The launch of the Doha Round has 
changed the traditional positions, giving the developing countries a voice. The last years the 
negotiations have revolved around the Quad, Australia, India and Brazil, also called the 
“Quint”.39 Another group that has seen as an political symbol for developing countries is G-
33, which includes Uruguay, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia to name a few. 
 
Finally, in reflecting upon the institutional role of the WTO, it is necessary to address some of 
the deep scepticism that accompanies the organization. The developing countries have since 
the beginning of GATT/WTO criticized the system for being a key part of the globalization 
process and that it together with IMF and World Bank through political and economical 
pressure, institutionalized corporate access to the markets and recourses of the developing 
world.40 The political structure of the WTO offer the developed countries more negotiation 
power to set the agenda as well as the negotiation conditions during the rounds, giving the 
developing countries limited prospects of influencing the multilateral system. Thus, the 
democratic deficit can continue distressing the legitimacy of the WTO and the MTS as whole. 
One way of making the WTO more inclusive and transparent are through equitable 
negotiation processes and increasing NGO accessibility so all WTO Members can be given 
adequate and fair access to the institutions for exchange of information and consultation.41 
 
2.3 The Rounds and Ministerial Conferences 
2.3.1 The Uruguay Round and the following Ministerial Meetings  
The Uruguay Round, 1986 -1994, covered almost all form of trade such as trade in service, 
intellectual property, agriculture and textiles. By the end as 123 countries were taking part in 
the Round, at times it seemed doomed to fail. Despite several collapsed negotiations, a deal 
was signed by ministers from most of the participating governments at a meeting in 
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Marrakesh, Morocco, thus called “the Marrakesh agreement”. 42  Although, the Uruguay 
Round faced several delays due to the political environment the postponement had some 
merits. It allowed some negotiations to progress further than would have been possible in 
1990, not to mention the creation of the WTO itself.    
 
The first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore 1996,43 established permanent working 
groups on four issues referred as “Singapore issues”; transparency in government 
procurement, trade facilitation, trade and investment, and trade and competition. The issues 
were initiatives from the U.S., EU, Japan and Korea, and opposed by most developing 
countries. The developing countries meant that the issues were about removing domestic 
legislation in the developing world that favored local companies over foreign companies. The 
industrialized countries, on the other hand, argued that the issues should be covered by the 
WTO system because of the principle of national treatment and the MFN-principle. 44  
Nevertheless, it was first when the Singapore Issues was adopted that trade facilitation 
became a topic to be further discussed on the multilateral trade agenda.45 
 
At the Second Ministerial Conference in Geneva 1998, 46  no agreement was reached on 
whether the next round of multilateral trade talks would cover mainly the Singapore issues or 
a wider range of issues. The EU called for incorporation of new issues beyond the agenda but 
several developing countries stressed that they would not accept negotiations on new issues 
unless their concerns about implementation of the existing agreements was taken into account. 
The “implementation issues” included: correcting imbalances in individual agreements that 
have institutionalized existing trade imbalances, ensuring that developed countries implement 
their commitments to developing countries in good faith and adaption of provisions regarding 
SDT for developing countries. 47 
 
The Ministerial Conference in Seattle 1999,48 became an internationally noticed conference 
because of the massive demonstrations and the collapsed negotiations. The background 
factors were that many developing countries felt that the Uruguay Round became too 
extensive with diminutive accomplishments, given the amount of time, energy and resources 
deployed. Many developing economies also wanted some relief from the obligations of the 
Uruguay Round, which they found difficult to meet with their ill-equipped financial institutes. 
The negotiations collapsed as a majority of developing countries did not participate in the 
Green Room process and found themselves marginalized. The final issue that created bad 
blood was agriculture since it remained, and still does, subject to profound and costly 
misrepresentation that the developing countries face.49  
 
 
2.3.2 The Launch of the Doha Round  
The fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha 2001,50 became the starting point of the ninth 
round. At this conference, ministers from all WTO members launched the DDA, mandating 
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further trade liberalization and new rule-making. The Ministerial Declaration launching the 
DDA lists 21 subjects, e.g. agriculture, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), services, 
the Singapore issues, WTO rules (anti-dumping, subsidies, regional trade agreements) and 
trade and environment. The DDA’s objective to lower trade barriers around the world, to 
improve the revenues and trade advantages for the developing countries, establishes the 
principle of SDT as central issue and an integral part of all elements of the negotiations.51 The 
aim was to conclude the Round with an Agreement by 2005, but was later prolonged to 2006.  
 
The issue that caused discussions between the WTO Members was the failure to reach 
consensus on modalities - such as formulas, regulation schemes, targets, timetables - for some 
of the issues involved in the Doha Round. Because the meeting took place just two months 
after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. and EU, called for greater political collaboration in the 
international trade society by linking terrorism and trade together. Security in the international 
supply chain was especially emphasized.52 Another important factor, which would later come 
to some extend modify the political balance in the WTO, was that the economic important 
China became a member after 15 years of negotiations.53  
 
The fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun 2003,54 ended without an agreement after Green 
Room meetings since consensus could not be reached on the Singapore issues. The lack of 
consensus on the Singapore issues’ investment and competition was the immediate cause for 
the deadlock, while the countries could agree on trade facilitation modalities. There was also 
an absence of greater commitments by the developed countries to reduce agricultural 
subsidies and lower import barriers on agricultural products.55  
 
After the Ministerial Conference ended in deadlock in Cancun, the WTO Members 
representatives in Geneva began efforts to put the negotiations and the rest of the work 
program back on track. Thus, a package of framework agreements was reached in the first 
half of 2004.56 The “July Package” of 2004 consists of clarification and strengthening of the 
initial work program which provides broad guidelines for completing the Doha round 
negotiations. The agreement contains guidelines for agriculture, NAMA, and services. For the 
first time, trade facilitation was recognized as an independent topic no longer linked to the 
Singapore Issues. 
 
At the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong 2005,57 the Ministerial Declaration highlighted 
the importance to attach the development dimension in every aspect of the DDA. A package 
of measures for the LDCs on trade-related intellectual property rights, and on capacity 
building was adopted. Aid for Trade was also the subject of consensus as to build the supply-
side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that LDC countries need to implement and 
benefit from the agreements. Although a quantity of progress was made, the WTO Members 
were unable to make much progress beyond agreeing to eliminate export subsidies in the 
agricultural trade negotiations.58  
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2.3.3 The Stagnation of the Doha Round  
Several informal Ministerial meetings with the main goal to find consensus on the key issues, 
mainly agriculture and market access, marked the years after the Ministerial Conference in 
Hong Kong. On July 21, 2008, a Mini-ministerial meeting was held at the WTO’s headquarter 
in Geneva. Around the world politicians, economists, NGOs and State representatives said 
there was a 50-50 % chance for success or total failure. Under nine days, 18 out of 20 issues 
were settled by some thirty key states in Green Room meetings. Director General of the WTO, 
Pascal Lamy, made an informal compromise agreement, which was approved by many WTO 
Members but firmly criticized by the US. Although there were significant efforts made on all 
sides throughout the negotiations the stagnation of the Doha Round was expected. Officially, 
the Doha Round stagnated over the refusal over primarily agricultural issues, more 
specifically the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM).59 Other issues that had some saying in 
the collapse of the negotiations were NAMA, cotton and agricultural subsidiaries.60 Trade 
facilitation was not discussed under the Green Room meetings since trade facilitation 
negotiations have been progressing without any major disagreements that could risk impeding 
future negotiations.61    
 
The distinguishing phenomenon at the ministerial meeting in July from the previous 
negotiations was the structural change in negotiating tactics among the WTO Members. LDCs 
and developing countries had gone from having delimited positions based on their historical 
background of being “South” countries to focus on economic issues that were of interest to 
their own country. For example, countries like Uruguay, Paraguay and Sri Lanka, did not 
automatically sympathized with India and China as they had done previously. Instead, they 
gave their support to the U.S. in certain positions.62 However, the importance of the changed 
positions is limited since there is still a strong division between the developed and developing 
countries.63 In other words, although the bargaining positions are starting to be modified as 
India and Brazil gain more power along with G-33, the majority of the developed states are 
still being marginalized in the international trading system.  
 
Even though, progress was made Pascal Lamy could in the end not bridge differences 
between emerging economies lead by India, Brazil and the fairly newcomer China, on one 
side and the U.S. and EU, on the other. The U.S. blamed India and Brazil for the collapse of 
the negotiations. The EU had a more nuanced standpoint and saw shortcoming from both U.S. 
and India. However, from the developing world perspective the Quad has been subjects for 
criticism. The developing countries complaints was that extensive U.S. subsidies squeeze 
their farmers out of the domestic and international market, reducing food supplies and 
contributing to the recent spike in global prices.64  
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2.4 Future Outlook 
As efforts to step up the positions for safeguarding the conclusion of the Doha Round, Lamy 
made political approaches to the U.S. and India, during the third week of August 2008. After 
several talks with respective state representatives, new exceptions rouse that the negotiations 
could be resumed during the end of 2008. There were signs from the WTO Members 
indicating that another mini-Ministerial Meeting should be hold around the middle of 
December to reach a breakthrough on the key issues, e.g. agriculture and NAMA. However, 
there has also been a widespread skepticism, especially from the U.S., that it would be to 
early to hold a new meeting before the installation of the new American administration.  
 
The new approach seems to be to suspend the negotiations until the new American 
administration is in place65, with fresh perspectives from the new administrations in India and 
the European Commission in order to find a bridge over the yawning negotiating gaps that 
defeat compromise today. Although, the financial crises have also been pointed out to hold 
back negotiations for the near future, there is a widespread political support for a multilateral 
agreement with a new urgency and importance to conclude the Doha Round. In times of 
difficulties, the WTO Members realize that international cooperation is beneficial - the same 
phenomenon happened after the 9/11 attacks when the launching of the Doha Round was 
hastened - which can work as an incentive to conclude the round.66 It has become clear that 
international business needs secure and improved market access to emerging countries and 
developing countries. Although, the Doha Round seem not to be the first priority at the time 
being there is a will to restore the negotiations when the economy is more stabile. There seem 
to be an understanding among the WTO Members that although the financial crisis might 
dictate the economical politics for now, better times are to come and the economical costs for 
e.g. trade facilitation will be an investment for the future.67 
 
The timetable the observers have foreseen of a draft agreement in the end of 2010 and a final 
agreement in 2011 will be difficult, but not impossible, to hold. The WTO Members would 
like to see some kind of agreement after years of negotiations, however, the topics covered 
and the degree of ambitious outcome might fluctuate. If same difficulties are imminent then 
there is a risk that a “package solution” is made where some crucial issues, such as agriculture 
and NAMA, are omitted while issues that are considered less complex, e.g.WTO rules and 
Aid for Trade, will be included.68      
 
2.5 Conclusions 
Concerning the introduction of trade facilitation in the WTO, it was an issue driven by the 
developed countries under the Singapore Issues, especially by the U.S. and the European 
countries. The developing countries and especially the LDCs showed modest interest on the 
subject with the arguments that they did not have the economical or technological means to 
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facilitate the improvements required under GATT. Some of their reluctance depended on the 
other Singapore Issues, and since it was more or less a “package offer”, trade facilitation 
became less important. However, the more pressure that was put on the developing countries 
to focus on trade facilitation, the more important became the “implementing issues” which the 
outcome of the Ministerial Conference in Geneva 1998 demonstrated. The developing 
countries stated that although they were willing to discuss trade facilitation they needed 
guarantees of assistance in form of SDT and technical assistance.  
 
In fact, although there was an initial reluctance, judging by the Ministerial Conferences to 
come, the WTO Members agreed on the benefits of trade facilitation, while the 
implementation issues was still to be discussed. After the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference in 2003, it became apparent that trade facilitation needed to become an 
independent issue on the DDA. In 2004, under the July Package, trade facilitation was finally 
launched as an autonomous trade topic.   
 
When the history of trade facilitation is studied, it becomes evident that the collapses and 
shortcomings of the Ministerial Conferences revolved around other issues, which illustrates 
the fact that trade facilitation - as an independent issue -  is not one of the subjects that 
hampers the negotiations. On the contrary, the benefits of trade facilitation seem to be one of 
the questions that the WTO Members can agree on although there are implementation issues 
that need to be solved. Moreover, it is true that at length, there is no guarantee that the Doha 
Round will be finalized in 2011 as foreseen but there are several factors pointing to new and 
successful negotiations; seven years of negotiations and implemented working programs will 
otherwise be of waste. Moreover, the multilateral conviction construct a mandate where many 
WTO Members are not prepared to give up the WTO up although they from time to time 
strongly criticize the MTS.69 
 
The WTO is the second largest intergovernmental organization after the UN and its position 
as an important trade developer in today’s globalized world is difficult to question, although it 
has obvious deficiencies. The trade organization is an institution based on rules and offers 
transparency to its members. The organization cannot claim to make all countries equal but it 
does reduce some inequities between the States and offers special treatment to the developing 
countries. Moreover, the WTO administers trade agreements, offers DSM for handling 
disputes, monitors national trade policies by its TPR and cooperate with other organizations. 
However, there is an evident limitation to the democratic legitimacy role of the WTO, naming 
the Green Room meetings as an example. The WTO does not exist beyond the commitment of 
its members and unfortunately, there is an obvious imbalance in the negotiation powers 
between the developing countries and the developed countries. The developing countries 
comprise 2/3 of the WTO but still the developed countries, or rather the Quad, sets the trade 
agenda. However, in all fairness, the WTO has been better received than IMF or the World 
Bank among the developing countries and there is still a belief that the organization, with 
some future improvements, can promote economic growth more than any of its counterparts.70 
 
Other issues that the WTO face as an organization is the difficulty of gathering 153 countries, 
and more countries to come, under consensus without involving the need of alliances and 
Green Room meetings. In addition, the size of a trade round can be questioned; perhaps it 
would be simpler to concentrate negotiations on fewer sectors? Although it is a legitimate 
question, have in mind, that at some stages, the Uruguay Round was so burdensome that it 
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seemed impossible to find consensus on the subjects between all participants but then again, 
the round did end successfully. In other words, the outcome of the Doha Round can be 
successful although the talks have stranded at the moment.  
 
The examination of the soft law instruments in the field of trade facilitation demonstrates 
that, contrary to what some have argued, there is no better institutional substitute than the 
WTO present today. Neither the Revised Kyoto Convention nor the TIR Convention can 
guarantee the same institutional benefits, such as SDT, or technical assistance like the WTO 
due to its voluntary nature. 71  However, since the Conventions have influenced trade 
facilitation in the WTO and since the Conventions provisions are not contrary to the GATT, 
it can safely be said that the soft law instruments can continue complementing but not 
replacing WTO law.  
 
Although, it is not the main purpose of the thesis to examine the institutional changes that 
need to be done in the WTO, it is important to point out some issues that can affect the 
outcome of the Doha Round. WTO must be subject for reformation and amendments to 
become a more democratic organization; otherwise, it can backfire on future negotiations. 
More transparency and equal involvement is required if the WTO is to keep its legitimacy. 
Actual decision-making should not be confined to major powers acting in the Green Room 
meetings, without giving the developing countries an opportunity for genuine participation. If 
those WTO Members that feel excluded from the process are given a fair opportunity to shape 
the trade agenda, the legitimacy of the WTO can be secured. There have been discussions 
concerning future institutional changes in the General Council, which could have a positive 
outcome when implemented.  
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3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADE SYSTEM 
 
As illustrated, trade facilitation has developed from being a down-prioritized component of 
the Singapore Issues to becoming an independent trade topic on the DDA. The negotiations 
have mostly been characterized by the modalities around trade facilitation, based on the 
proposals that have been submitted by the WTO Members. In course of the negotiations, the 
scope of the SDT and technical assistance, have been intensively discussed and the 
advancement of these discussion are essential to analyze. The DSM’s role for serving trade 
facilitation has also been widely discussed. For enhancing reader comprehension, an 
examination of the legal provisions regulating trade facilitation together with the proposals 
submitted is to be examined. Lastly, the alternative approaches to a multilateral agreement are 
scrutinized.               
3.1 Trade Facilitation’s Negotiation History 
Several fundamental trade facilitation principles in Articles V, VIII and X were contained in 
the GATT from its foundation in 1948. For almost 50 years, the further development of trade 
facilitation principles within the multilateral system was undeveloped while other customs 
related provisions of GATT 1948 were in focus. Then, shortly after the WTO came into 
existence, proposals were made for trade facilitation commitments at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore in 1996:  
 
The technical cooperation programme the Secretariat will be available to 
developing and, in particular, least-developed country Members to facilitate 
their participation in this work.72  
Trade facilitation as one of four Singapore Issues, was specifically assigned to the Council for 
Trade in Goods. Thus, trade facilitation was the only one of those issues that did not have an 
independent working group for discussions and negotiations. However, a great deal of 
preparations and investigations came to follow the coming years. Between 1997 and 1999, the 
Council for Trade in Goods gathered information on various aspects of trade facilitation from 
several regional and multinational organizations such as WCO and UNECE. Information was 
also gathered from private enterprises and industry groups that reported the experiences they 
had in their work on trade facilitation.73 During this time, several WTO members presented 
papers on their experiences with various aspects of trade facilitation. The main concerns 
concluded was excessive documentation requirements, lack of transparency, inadequate 
procedures and a lack of modernization of customs and other government agencies.74  
During the preparations for the 1999 WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle, several WTO 
Members from the developed world – lead by the EU, Japan and US - made official 
submissions to WTO. They advocated the launch of negotiations on trade facilitation as part 
of the new WTO Round, despite the insistence by some members that more research was 
needed. However, the meeting was unable to agree on the new agenda for the Doha Round 
and the negotiations were not started. There was, nevertheless, one notable development for 
trade facilitation in the Seattle Ministerial Conference. The range of discussions on trade 
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facilitation was reduced and concentrated on the three mentioned Articles. Import and export 
procedures and requirements a long with technical cooperation and development issues were 
also discussed.75  
 
3.1.1 Trade Facilitation excluded from the Doha Development Agenda 
During the Ministerial Conference in Doha 2001, attempts were once again made to include 
trade facilitation, together with the other Singapore Issues in the agenda for the new round of 
negotiations. However, the WTO Members could not reach consensus. Reportedly, some 
WTO Members objected to treating some of the Singapore Issues individually rather than 
collectively. Nevertheless, the WTO Members could agree on the magnitude of trade 
facilitation and decided to continue with the progresses made. The Doha Ministerial 
Declaration stated that: 
 
Recognizing the case for further expediting the movement, release and 
clearance of goods, including goods in transit, and the need for enhanced 
technical assistance and capacity building in this area […] and identify the 
trade facilitation needs and priorities of members, in particular developing and 
least-developed countries. We commit ourselves to ensuring adequate 
technical assistance and support for capacity building in this area. 
 
The same year the WTO Members proceeded to carry out the Doha mandate by adopting a 
work program for 2002 addressing three core agenda items. Firstly, continued reassessment 
and submission of proposals regarding Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT. Secondly, trade 
facilitation requests and priorities of WTO Members particularly of developing and LDCs. 
Thirdly, to find a solution on the notorious technical assistance and capacity-building program 
(TA/CB). Several delegations continued underlining the importance of TA/CB for facilitating 
trade, as they had done before. 
 
There were many developing countries, while supportive of the objectives of trade facilitation, 
did not want to take on new legal obligations in the WTO at this point in time. The concern 
was that additional rules would exceed their implementation capacities and expose them to 
dispute settlements. Some also expressed their preference for trade facilitation work to be 
undertaken at the national, bilateral or regional level.76 Regarding TA/CB, WTO Members 
emphasized the importance they attached to this subject and to the work being carried by 
bilateral donors and international organizations in the area. It was stressed that work 
concerning trade facilitation should progress in parallel with the substantive part of the 
discussions in the Goods Council. This in order to develop a technical assistance work 
program directed both to providing guidance and to building capacity to implement the 
eventual results.  
In 2003, the WTO Members continued their work on trade facilitation under the DDA 
mandate. The TA/CB program was in focus for several WTO Members, especially the LDC:s. 
In the course of those meetings, the WTO Members continued to submit proposals and 
continued their previous discussions regarding the improvement and clarification of Articles 
V, VIII and X of the GATT.77  
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3.1.2 Trade Facilitation on the Doha Development Agenda 
The “July package”, that was adopted 2004 after the Ministerial Conference in Cancun, 
included measures that was going to be taken in the field of trade facilitation. In line with the 
modalities for the negotiations set out in Annex D of that decision, the Trade Negotiations 
Committee appointed the Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation (NGTF).78 For the first 
time in WTO’s history, trade facilitation had become an independent issue and now part of 
the DDA. Regarding STD and TA/CB it was decided that they are integral parts of the 
negotiations and linked to the outcome. The WTO Members gave emphasis to the fact that 
LDCs will only be required to undertake commitments to the extent consistent with their 
individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative and institutional 
capabilities.79 Moreover, the mandate encourages the WTO Members to: 
 
As an integral part of the negotiations, Members shall seek to identify trade 
facilitation needs and priorities, particularly those of developing and least-
developed countries related to cost implications of proposed measures.80 
In 2005, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration declared a list of proposed measures to 
improve and clarify Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT as well as provisions for effective 
cooperation between customs and other authorities on trade facilitation. 81  The NGTF 
recommended that relevant international organizations to be invited to continue to assist 
Members in this process. 82  The importance of TA/CB was stated in the Ministerial 
Declaration as follows: 
Work needs to continue and broaden on the process of identifying 
individual Member's trade facilitation needs and priorities, and the cost 
implications of possible measures. The Negotiating Group recommends 
that relevant international organizations be invited to continue to assist 
Members in this process recognizing the important contributions being  
made by them already, and be encouraged to continue and intensify their  
work more generally in support of negotiations.83  
 
Recognizing the valuable assistance already have being provided in this area, the NGTF 
recommended that the WTO Members, in particular the developed ones, continue to intensify 
their support in a comprehensive manner and on a long-term and sustainable basis and 
continue working for a successful TA/CB program.84  
The July 2008 package was created as a stepping-stone on the way to conclude the Doha 
Round by the end of 2008. Although, it is evident that the aim has failed the package sets the 
agenda for the months to come. The NGTF announced in the July Package 2008 that:  
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Work will continue to take place in a variety of configurations, combining 
NGTF sessions with complementary activities by the Membership in 
various formats (bilateral, plurilateral, open-ended).  In this context, I 
particularly encourage delegations to intensify their ongoing informal, 
open-ended process of negotiations on SDT and capacity-building.  The 
outcome of these initiatives will be reported back to the NGTF on a regular 
basis with the Negotiating Group equally reporting on the state-of-play of 
its work to the TNC. 85   
Trade facilitation was never under discussion during the Mini-Ministerial meeting in July 
2008, nevertheless, the NGTF have been continuing with its meetings to further refine the 
latest proposals under Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT, as well as on the issues of SDT 
for developing countries and on TA/CB support were made.86 There have been concerns 
raised regarding the financing of technical assistance due to the financial difficulties many 
developed countries are facing. However, the costs for technical assistance that the developed 
countries might come to share are donations that will be completed, first after a future 
agreement is reached. Thus, there is a hope that the financial crises have recovered until then 
and diminished the reluctance that these governments might have at the time being when 
central banks and regulatory authorities are adopting financial help packages, injecting 
liquidity, and restructuring financial institutions.87 
 
Some months after the stagnation of the negotiations in July in Geneva, the importance of 
technical assistance for the implementation of trade facilitation became observable when 
Spain offered a donation about EUR 350,000 to the DDAGTF. The donation was made to 
continue finance technical assistance programs and training activities for Latin American and 
Caribbean countries for 2008.88 The Doha Round might have stagnated for the moment, 
however, the work within the WTO and the international organizations continue until it is 
decided when the Doha Round is going to be resumed. 
 
The outlooks for trade facilitation are positive although the negotiations are moving forward 
in a slow pace. Trade facilitation has developed a stabile negotiation foundation even if 
several crosscutting issues such as SDT and TA/CB, are yet to be solved. These issues 
together with two additional factors can affect the degree of success in a trade facilitation 
agreement. First, the issues around modalities are still very detailed and complicated which 
makes the negotiation process time-consuming. Second, at present there is still no final 
textual proposal on trade facilitation, only submitted proposals on the modalities. In 
conclusion, these circumstances will with the highest probability, yield the possibilities to 
reach a commanding agreement in the future.89   
 
Regarding the suggestions to lift trade facilitation from the DDA, and make it a separate 
agreement as a development plan or development package together with Aid for Trade, the 
reception seems to be rather cold among the trade representatives in the NGTF. Although, the 
issue has been discussed in the NGTF there is a consensus that they are not real options since 
the negotiations are progressing relatively well. These alternative suggestions can become 
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accurate options when there are no other ways left to reach consensus on trade facilitation. 
For now, they are no dependable options and thus further not examined in this thesis.90   
3.2 Implementing Trade Facilitation - Legal Rights and Duties  
3.2.1 Article V of the GATT – Goods in Transit 
Article V of the GATT has never been interpreted either by a GATT/WTO panel or by the 
AB. Due to the lack of such guidance, the meaning and scope of the Article’s provisions can 
only be clarified by applying the rules a panel would apply when interpreting the WTO 
provisions.91  
 
(1) Traffic in transit 
Paragraph 1, considers only goods (including baggage), vessels and other means of transport to 
constitute traffic within the meaning of the paragraph. Whether freedom of transit should also 
extend to goods transferred to a country in bond without a final destination, has been under 
discussion, however, no agreement have been reached so it was decided not to pursue the matter 
any further.92  Clarification is needed in future negotiations so discrimination among modes of 
transport and types of carriers where there is no obvious reason for differing transit 
procedures is dealt with. 
 
(2) Freedom of transit 
Freedom of transit, paragraph 2, requires each Member State to allow free transition through its 
territory for traffic in transit to or from the territory of another Member State. However, the 
freedom of transit has one important restriction; “via the routes most convenient for 
international transit” means that the duty to grant free transit does not extend to all routes.93 
How the restriction should be interpreted in practice has not yet been challenged and is thereby 
difficult to apply on real transport cases. 
(3) No unnecessary delays or restrictions 
Except in cases of failure to comply with applicable customs laws and regulations, traffic 
coming from or passing through the territory of another Member “shall not be subject to any 
unnecessary delays or restrictions”.94 Charges and regulations imposed by a Member State on 
traffic in transit to or from the territories of another Member, shall be “reasonable, having 
regard to the conditions of the traffic.”   
 
(4) Reasonable charges and regulations 
According to paragraph 4, “all charges and regulations imposed by contracting parties on 
traffic in transit to or from the territories of other contracting parties shall be reasonable, 
having regard to the conditions of the traffic”. The word 'charges' should be interpreted 
including charges for transportation by government-owned railroads or government-owned 
modes of transportation.” 95   
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(5) MFN- treatment 
The paragraph states “no less favourable than the treatment accorded to traffic in transit to or 
from any third country” of traffic in transit with respect to all charges, regulations and 
formalities in connection with transit.  
 
(6) Products in transit through other territories 
Each WTO Member has to treat products, which have been in transit through the territory of 
another Member State, “no less favourable than that which would have been accorded to such 
products had they been transported from their place of origin to their destination without going 
through the territory of such other contracting party”.96  
 
(7) Air transit  
The Article shall not apply to the operation of aircraft in transit, but shall apply to air transit 
of goods. 
 
3.2.2 General about the Proposals 
Between the Ministerial Conferences, the NGTF has discussed the proposals that have been 
submitted concerning the modalities for trade facilitation. Under the “July Package 2004” 
modalities for negotiation on trade facilitation was finally reached. They have, however, been 
modified during the years as WTO Members’ textual proposals have increased, counting 70 
proposals as of today. A quick examination of the submitted proposals demonstrates that a 
few countries are involved in the work but the groupings go beyond economic divisions of 
developed and developing countries. On the contrary, it appears to be a mixture of coalition 
between mainly the developed countries signified by the U.S., the EU, Hong-Kong, 
Switzerland and Korea on one hand and the developed countries e.g. Uganda and Rwanda on 
the other hand. 97 Some of the developing countries that are active in the negotiations are 
perhaps not as involved in other topics of the Doha Round negotiations. When the proposals 
are being negotiated in the NGTF there are still traces of a division between developed and 
developing countries and the main concerns for the developing countries are to get the right 
amount of assistance while for the developed countries they are to meet the demands in an 
appropriate way. Since the discussions of the modalities are in some ways more detailed and 
complex, compared to trade subjects where perhaps percentages of market share are being 
bargained upon, the negotiations are going slowly but forward.98    
 
3.2.3 Proposals regarding Article V of the GATT 
The measures involve among other things are strengthening non-discrimination, disciplines 
on fees and charges and most importantly improved co-ordination and co-operation amongst 
authorities and the private sector. One of the proposals to make the process of goods in transit 
more efficient is publication of fees and charges but also prohibition of unpublished ones. In 
practice, the published information shall include the reason for the transit fee or charge (the 
service provided), the responsible authority, the transit fees and charges applicable, and when 
and how payments have been made. Moreover, WTO Members shall make this information 
readily available to all interested parties and inform other WTO Members where this 
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information is available. To guarantee that the information is disclosed the necessary data can 
be published via an officially designated medium, e.g. official website.99  
 
Another suggestion concerns periodic review of fees and charges, which offers WTO Member 
to periodically review its transit fees and charges to ensure that they are in line with WTO 
commitments a long with reducing their number and diversity.100 An additional suggestion is 
more effective disciplines on charges for transit. This advocates the exemption of traffic in 
transit from customs duties, transit duties and other fees, except transit fees and charges that 
are commensurate with the cost of the service rendered.101 
 
3.3 Article VIII of the GATT - Fees and Formalities connected with 
Importation and Exportation 
In contrast to Article V of the GATT, several disputes settled by a panel or the AB have 
revolved around Article VIII of the GATT. The Article explicitly limits fees and charges in 
connection with importation and exportation of goods to the approximate cost of services 
rendered.  
 
(1) Reducing the number of fees and minimizing the incidence complexity of formalities and 
services rendered 
In addition to defining the remaining category of fees connected with importation and 
exportation to which Article VIII of the GATT applies, paragraph 1(a) contains the principal 
legal obligations imposed pursuant to that provision. WTO Members are directed to limit all 
fees and charges “in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered”. The phrase 
“services rendered” refers to governments’ regulatory activities performed in connection to 
the customs entry processes, e.g. processing and clearing of documents and goods, along with 
inspections. 102   It is crucial that such fees and charges does not “represent an indirect 
protection to domestic products or a taxation of importations or exportations for fiscal 
purposes.”   
 
In US - Customs User Fee, the panel summarized the nature of Article VIII:1(a) of the GATT 
as rule applicable to all charges levied at the border, except tariffs and charges which serve to 
equalize internal taxes.  The provision prohibits all such charges unless they satisfy the three 
criteria listed in that provision:  
 
a) it must be limited in amount to the approximate cost 
of services rendered, 
b) it must not represent an indirect protection to domestic 
products, 
c) it must not represent a taxation of imports for fiscal 
purposes.   
 
The panel noted that consular fees, customs fees, and statistical fees had been treated as 
falling within the scope of Article VIII:1(a) of the GATT. Also, the panel found that a 
merchandise processing fee for imports was covered by the same paragraph.103  
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The panel in EEC - Minimum Import Prices considered whether a fine that was demanded, 
when no importation took place within the date specified in an import certificate, was a 
penalty or not. Such form of a penalty should be considered as part of an enforcement 
mechanism, and not as a fee or formality “in connection with importation”, within the 
purview of Article VIII of the GATT.104  The potential fine of security deposit was also at 
issue in EEC – Bananas II, where the panel agreed that the potential fine did not, as such, fall 
within the Article.105  
 
Paragraph 1(b) does not contain specific legal requirements and neither does paragraph 1(c). 
The provisions are rather, recognitions from the WTO Members to “recognize the need for 
reducing the number and diversity of fees and charges” and “for minimizing the incidence 
and complexity of import and export formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import 
and export documentation requirements.” The panel in EEC – Bananas II examined the last 
part. The question was whether the banana import licensing procedures at issue were 
consistent with Article VIII:1(c) of the GATT or not. According to the panel, the article refers 
to import formalities and documentation requirements, not to the trade regulations, which 
such formalities or requirements enforce. The complaining parties had criticized the 
complexity of the banana import regulations but the panel found that they had not submitted 
any evidence substantiating that the formalities and documentation requirements, by 
themselves, were more complex than necessary to enforce the regulations. The panel therefore 
found that the requirements were not inconsistently with the Article.106  
 
(2) Review of laws and regulations 
A Member State is according to paragraph 2, required to review the operation of its “laws and 
regulations in the light of the provisions of this Article,” at the request of another Member or 
the relevant WTO body. The paragraph does, however, not stipulate any direct and 
unconditional obligation to take action, for example reduce fees and formalities, even if the 
country comes to the conclusion that they are too numerous or diverse.  
 
(3)Prohibition for substantial penalties for minor breaches 
The imposition of “substantial” penalties for minor breaches of customs regulations or 
procedures are prohibited in paragraph 3. Specifically, when customs documentation contains 
mistakes that are “obviously made without fraudulent intent or gross negligence”, then the 
penalties imposed as a consequence of such mistakes or omissions may not exceed what is 
“necessary to serve merely as a warning.”107 
 
(4) The applicable fees, charges, formalities and requirements 
The last paragraph of Article VIII of the GATT sets forth an illustrative list of the types of 
fees, charges, formalities and requirements that fall within the scope of the Article.  These 
include fees, charges, formalities and requirements relating to consular transactions, licensing, 
exchange control, statistical services, documentation and certification, as well as analysis and 
inspection.108 
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3.3.1 Proposals regarding Article VIII of the GATT 
The textual proposals, which have been submitted to the NGTF, regarding fees and 
formalities connected with importation and exportation are mostly regarding specific 
parameters for charges, prohibition on collection of unpublished charges and periodically 
revision of charges and fees.109 The measures are proposed as an effort to establish principles 
for fees and charges connected to importation and exportation with the aim of reducing their 
number and diversity.  
  
Measures have been proposed to make formalities connected with importation and 
exportation as least trade restrictive possible while ensuring countries’ legitimate control.110 
One of the recognized proposals is reduction/limitation of formalities and documentation 
requirements”.111 The WTO Members are according to the proposal obliged to minimize the 
complexity of formalities, and simplify import and export documentation requirements to 
ensure that such formalities are no more administratively burdensome or trade restrictive than 
necessary and thus not constitute unnecessary obstacle to trade.112  
 
The most effective and important proposal, that several WTO Members from the developed 
and developing world have agreed upon, is the “Single Window” system.113  The system 
allows parties involved in trade and transport to lodge standardized information and 
documents with a single entry point to fulfill all import, export and transit related regulatory 
requirements. Since all information is electronic, then individual data need only to be 
submitted once. Some of the benefits for the governments are efficient deployment of 
resources, improved trader compliance, enhanced supply chain security and transparency. 
Benefits for industry include predictable application and explanation of rules, as well as faster 
clearance and release.114 Due to the different technical level of the WTO Members it is 
allowed to implement the single window in a progressive way and there are propels made that 
the LDCs should get technical assistance so they can comply with the regulations.115  
 
Border agency cooperation is another proposal in order to facilitate the improvements, e.g. by 
aligning opening hours and sharing customs facilitates.116  Several measures proposed are 
regarding simplifying release and clearance of goods. Pre-arrival processing is one of the 
concrete examples, which means that the WTO Members should maintain or introduce, 
depending on their financial status, administrative procedures of customs to accept and 
examine import documentation by traders prior to the arrival of the goods. 117 In cases where 
it is decided that no further examination or documentation is required, goods should be 
cleared immediately upon arrival. Like most other proposal, STD is applied; LDCs should not 
be required to apply these provisions under the same period as their wealthier counterparts.118  
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3.4 Article X of the GATT- Publications and Administration of Trade 
Regulation 
Article X, has just like Article VIII of the GATT, been the subject for both panels’ or the AB’s 
assessment. However, there are still some legal question marks that need to be clarified in 
future negotiations. 
 
(1) Publication of laws, regulations, rulings and agreements of general application  
Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application 
regarding e.g. rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or affecting their sale, distribution shall be 
published promptly in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become 
acquainted with them. The paragraph does not require any contracting party to disclose 
confidential information, which would impede law enforcement, or otherwise be contrary to 
the public interest.  
 
The AB upheld in US – Underwear the panel’s interpretation “of general application” and 
explained the scope of “administrative rulings”. The fact that it is a country-specific measure 
excludes the possibility of it being a measure of general application.  If a restraint is addressed 
to a specific company or is applicable to a specific shipment, it will not qualify as a measure of 
general application. However, to the extent that the restraint affects an unidentified number of 
economic operators, including domestic and foreign producers, it must be recognized as a 
measure of general application.119  In EC – Poultry, the AB upheld the panel’s finding that the 
withholding of information regarding a specific shipment was not inconsistent with Article X of 
the GATT because it was outside its scope. Although, any measure of general application will 
always have to be applied in specific cases, the specific treatment, nevertheless, accorded to 
each individual shipment cannot be considered to be within the meaning of Article X of the 
GATT.120   
 
In Canada – Alcoholic Drinks, the panel held that Article X of the GATT: did not require the 
WTO Members to make information affecting trade available to domestic and foreign suppliers 
at the same time. Nor did it require the WTO Members to publish trade regulations in advance 
of their entry into force.121 The AB in EC - Poultry recognizes the scope of Article X of the 
GATT as to the publication and administration of “laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings of general application”, rather than to the substantive content of such 
measures, which fall outside the scope of the Article.122  
 
(2) Abstain from enforcing measures of general application prior to their publication  
No Member State is allowed to enforce certain measures prior to their official publication. The 
measures that are prohibited are two, starting with “measure of general application taken by 
any contracting party effecting an advance in a rate of duty or other charge on imports under 
an established and uniform practice.” Nor is it sufficient with “imposing a new or more 
burdensome requirement, restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of payments” 
before such measure has been officially published. 
 
According to the AB in US – Underwear, the provision embraces the principle of transparency. 
It depends on the disclosure requirements of national legislation affecting WTO Members, 
private persons and enterprises, whether they are of domestic or foreign nationality. The 
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essential implication is that WTO Members and other parties affected by governmental 
measures imposing requirements and other burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to 
acquire authentic information about such measures and accordingly to adjust their activities so 
they become righteous.123  
 
(3) Administration in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner 
The WTO Members’ are called upon to administer “all its laws, regulations, decisions and 
rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article.” This process should be dealt with 
in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.” 124  Certain guarantees are made with 
respect to their independence, as the provision obliges those tribunals or procedures to be 
independent from the agencies in charge of the administrative enforcement.125 The importance 
behind the provision lies in the insurance that it is not the same entity that makes the decision 
that also takes care of its implementation. However, an exception is made in subparagraph 3(c) 
for procedures, which “in fact provide for an objective and impartial review of administrative 
action,” if they have already been in force “on the date of the Agreement.” 126 If a party 
wishes to employ such procedures it is, however, required to notify them to the other parties 
upon request.   
 
The AB stated that the requirements of “uniformity, impartiality and reasonableness” of Article 
X:3(a) of the GATT clearly indicates that the provision do not apply to the laws, regulations, 
decisions and rulings themselves, but rather to the administration of them. This was stated in EC 
– Bananas III,127  and reaffirmed by a later panel, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset 
Review. The panel hold that it is well established that only the administration of laws and 
regulations can be challenged under Article X:3(a) of the GATT and emphasized again that it is 
not the laws and regulations themselves. 128 In other words, if a contracting party find the 
contents of laws and regulations discriminatory or burdensome they can be challenged under 
relevant provisions of the covered agreements and not under the Article X:3 of the GATT.    
 
When the panel interpreted in US – Hot-Rolled Steel the definition of ”in a uniform, impartial 
and reasonable manner” the conclusion was that for a Member State's measure to violate the 
provision, it would have to have a significant impact on the overall administration of that 
Member State’s law - as opposed to a mere impact on the outcome in the individual case in 
question.129 Moreover, the panel in Argentina – Bovine Hides, reaffirmed what it had said 
earlier by explaining the term “uniform” as the provision should not be read as a broad anti-
discrimination provision. That would be putting far too much importance into the provision, 
which in turn would make the day-to-day application of customs laws, rules and regulations 
impossible.130   
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3.4.1 Proposals regarding Article X of the GATT 
Prominent proposals have been submitted concerning the Article’s application on publication 
of all laws, regulations, requirements and procedures in connection with transit. Other 
proposals are concerning time period between the publication of transit formalities and 
documentation requirements and their entry into force. The use of international standards, 
improved cooperation and coordination, a long with clarification of terms are also likely to 
form part of a future agreement.131 Regarding the first area of application all proposals are 
pertaining to transparency since official sources are designed to be available for traders in a 
non-discriminatory manner. The proposal about Internet publication 132  means that WTO 
Members shall provide a copy of all laws, regulations, and administrative rulings of trade-
related procedures, which are entered into force through official means such as national 
website.133  
 
Regarding the second area of application, the proposal is about ensuring that a reasonable 
time is left between the publication of new or amended trade regulations and their entry into 
force. Such a time period would enable traders to become acquainted with the new rules and 
well prepared for compliance with the rules. Since the importance of cooperation with the 
business community is well established, one of the proposals declares that governments 
should consult with traders, through regular consultations between traders and border 
agencies. These consultation mechanisms can help the government to avoid excessive costs 
for the beneficial of the traders, which result in assistance from the traders with e.g. 
technology assistance to facilitate the required adjustments.134    
 
Another proposal is the right of appeal135 where each of the Member State’s legalization shall 
ensure that traders have the right of appeal, without penalty, against decisions by customs and 
other relevant border agencies.136 Lastly, measures to ensure consistency and predictability in 
the administration of rules and procedures - by uniform administration of trade regulations, 
establishment of a code of conduct, and education for the personnel - have been submitted. 
Efforts to restrain corruption are thereby addresses by the proposals.137   
 
3.5 Soft Law Instruments Relating to Trade Facilitation 
3.5.1 Special and Differential Treatment  
Like discussed earlier, in all Ministerial Declarations time after time the importance of SDT 
has been recognized in order for the developing countries to benefit from trade facilitation. 
Thus, the WTO Members committed themselves to providing their support for SDT. The 
WTO Agreement’s special provisions regarding SDT include: 
i)  provisions aimed at increasing trade opportunities through market access, 
ii)  provisions requiring WTO Members to safeguard the interest of developing 
countries,  
provisions allowing flexibility to developing countries in rules and 
disciplines governing trade measures 
                                                          
131
 Bolhöfer , Trade Facilitation – WTO Law and its Revision to Facilitate Global Trade in Goods, p 390. 
132
 Turkey, TN/TF/W/132/Rev.1, A, 2 (a). See also Appendix p 58. 
133
 TN/TF/W/43/Rev.13,  p 9. 
134
 Bolhöfer , Trade Facilitation – WTO Law and its Revision to Facilitate Global Trade in Goods, pp 390-391 
and National Board of Trade, Trade facilitation and Swedish experiences, pp 61-62. 
135
 Japan and Mongolia, TN/TF/W/116, E (1). See also Appendix p 58. 
136
 TN/TF/W/43/Rev.13,  p 13. 
137
 National Board of Trade’s publication Trade facilitation and Swedish experiences, p 61. 
   
  37 
iv)  support to help developing countries build their infrastructure, handle 
disputes, and technical assistance, and  
v)  provisions allowing longer transitional periods to developing countries.138  
 
On trade facilitation, LDCs will only be required to undertake commitments to the extent 
consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative 
and institutional capabilities. Regarding technical assistance the negotiations have been 
focused on the implementation on two steps; first, the assessment of the LDCs necessitates 
and second, the capacity of the LDCs. SDT mandate different obligations under three classes 
when measuring the capacity and thus the assistance required:     
Category A - the agreement will enter into force when executed without 
extended time frames or technical assistance. NICs are usually considered 
under this category.  
Category B - the agreement will be implemented a certain period after the 
agreement has come into force. The extended time frame is generally 
required by the developing countries. 
Category C - the implementation of the agreements depends on the amount 
of TA/ CB and thus extended time frames. In general, developing countries 
and especially LDCs are in need of special treatment.139 
 
The WTO Members have been discussing the degree of help required under the assessment 
program in line with the overall progress in the negotiations, having focused mainly on 
Category B and C assistance. The developed countries have expressed strong willpower 
particularly on the second part of the technical assistance scheme; the actual implementation 
of trade facilitation. The negotiations are sensitive especially since a balance has to be found 
between the degree of accurate assistance for the developing countries and the costs for the 
developed countries to provide the required technical assistance. Otherwise, because of the 
SDT mandate, the developed countries will have no obligation to implement trade facilitation. 
This leads to sensitive and complex issues regarding the nature of SDT as a soft law 
instrument. 
      
The most significant difficulty with the SDT is their non-binding character. Several existing 
SDT provisions are of a truly mandatory nature, nevertheless, the general state of the 
language of the obligations cause both judicial and political implications. The substantial 
majority of existing SDT provisions is either discretionary or de facto non-binding in nature. 
Legally, this means that most of the provisions upon which developing WTO Members seek 
to rely are either unenforceable (“may”), or employ vague or undefined standards (“take 
account of”). Hence, the GATT Articles that regulate trade facilitation proclaims duties from 
its Members by using the mandatory language “shall”.140 Politically, this has contributed to 
the sense, expressed by many developing countries, that what they believed they had been 
promised as part of the Uruguay Round package of negotiated agreements has in fact not been 
delivered. The fact that the developing countries felt increasingly frustrated, in the end caused 
to derail the Seattle Ministerial and now the fear of some LDCs are that even if the Doha 
Round is successfully concluded, history will repeat itself.  
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In order to improve SDT some developing countries and scholars argue that implementation 
of SDT should be flexible as to fit the needs of specific countries, issues, and sectors, it 
should be implemented on “case by case” basis and most importantly, SDT should be 
mandatory. A binding commitment (“require” or “shall”) is then not only being composed by 
developed countries but also on developing and emerging economies regarding beneficial 
commitments toward LLDCs. Such countries risk being held hostage to their territorial 
boundaries in the absence of fair, transparent and non-discriminatory rules providing for 
rights of transit.141 Binding rules would allow those rights to be enforced for the benefit of all 
WTO Members in the long run, however, it is a sensitive question for developed countries 
that feel that the current “obligations” are enough without making them mandatory. Moreover, 
although binding commitments could guarantee the LDCs to get the technical assistance 
needed, binding commitments are impossible from a legal and political perspective. Legally, 
it is not achievable to bind other international organizations, e.g. World Band or IMF, 
involved in the TA/CB programs since they are not members of the organization. The only 
tools that the WTO has are to invite the organizations to cooperate with the WTO. Politically, 
although assessment programs are carried out, it is impracticable for the Member States to 
bind themselves to conditions when the amount of technical assistance, both economically 
and personnel wise, is uncertain.142 
 
Another sensitive issue is regarding the selective political requirements that the donor 
countries might have on the LDCs in relation to the level of SDT and TA/CB delivered to 
them. There is a concern among the developing countries that some regions might get better 
technical assistance or financial deals depending on the donor’s interest in the region. The 
division being made regardless of the grounds it is based on; historical (e.g. colonial), 
political (e.g. participation in the war on terror), judicial (e.g. greater degree of deregulated 
business environment) or economical (e.g. in exchange for natural recourses). Since the 
system of SDT is voluntarily, the risk is that the selective regional investments are 
implemented in opposition to the MFN-principle, which put the legitimacy and efficiency of 
the whole system at risk. This is another reason to why many developing countries, weather 
they will be subject for selective political requirements or not, argue for binding SDT 
provisions. In this way, although the prerequisites and delivered assistance will be customized 
for the specific country in question, there will be different dimension of openness and 
auditing in addition to political and judicial assessment of the agreements.143 This form of 
regionalism and selective political undertakings is a dire discourse since it improves some of 
the peaceful and emerging regions to the better, but leaves others with political or social 
difficulties e.g. some African regions, to their own destiny. Thus, regionalism from a 
developing perspective regarding the amount of SDT and technical assistance, can work as a 
“building block” or “stumbling block”, depending on the region and donor/s involved as well 
as the political, economical and judicial requirements involved.144  
3.5.2 Technical Assistance  
The weight of TA/CB have also been emphasized, in the DDA, Ministerial Conferences and 
other important WTO official documents, in order for the developing and LDCs to fully 
participate in and benefit from the negotiations and a future agreement.145 When it comes to 
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trade facilitation usually technical assistance, rather than capacity building is under discussion. 
The following elements have been identified as essential for the successful execution of trade 
facilitation-related technical assistance programs: 
 
i) the political willpower of governments to undertake reforms and 
improvements,  
ii) cooperation and coordination among the providers of technical assistance,  
iii) transparency of reform programs and the national legal systems,  
iv) the involvement of governments, business community, customs and other 
governmental authority in the execution of trade facilitation measures, 
v) the responsiveness of trade assistance programmes to particular needs of 
recipients, 
vi) the use of agreed benchmarks.146 
 
Since the start of the negotiations on trade facilitation, LDCs seem to have been increasingly 
devoting more attention to the mechanisms of SDT and technical assistance as regards to 
trade facilitation.147 Technical assistance program, which is offered in co-operation with the 
IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, World Bank and WCO, is a two-step program. First, under “WTO 
Trade Facilitation National Needs Assessment Project”, which is the result of LDCs proposals, 
the LDC can upon request from the WTO Members conduct a national self assessment of 
their individual trade facilitation needs and priorities. The purpose of the program is to 
contribute to more effective participation of Members in the negotiations. Thus, the 
assessment will provide detailed information on technical assistance requirements of recipient 
countries and will provide a valuable basis for the eventual implementation of any results of 
the negotiations. Until today, 80 requests have been made and 35 assessments conducted. The 
aim is to finalize the remaining requests by 2009. Second, when an agreement is reached on 
trade facilitation, another program will enforce the modalities set by the WTO Members 
under the negotiations. 148  The negotiations for now revolve around the first step of the 
program since a final agreement has not yet been reached.   
 
The main concerns of LDCs are modalities for self-assessments and modalities to be used 
when providing technical assistance. However, the developing countries’ concern is that they 
will have difficulties with implementing the measures and that the promised assistance will be 
absent. Other fears are that technical assistance will be delivered unhurried and inadequate to 
address their problems.149 The same concerns are also raised regarding the non-binding nature 
of the program; many LDCs require some kind of guarantees before they endorse an 
agreement.   
 
To assist LDCs to meaningfully gain on the benefits of the rules-based trading system and to 
participate effectively in the ongoing negotiations, the WTO Secretariat continues to give 
priority attention to technical assistance for LDCs. This is both in terms of numbers of 
activities to be offered (LDCs can have up to three national activities compared to two for 
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others) as well as in terms of the closer consultative process they are to benefit from, for 
example the assessment program for their needs.150  
In addition to the technical assistance provided by the WTO, LDCs also benefit from the  
Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance to Least-Developed Countries 
(IF), which was endorsed in the DDA 2000.  The IF is a partnership initiative between among 
the LDCs, multilateral agencies 151  and bilateral donors aimed at assisting the LDCs to 
increase their participation in the multilateral trading system and global economy. The IF is 
mainly responsible for awareness building on the importance of trade for development, 
strategy plan of action for integrating trade facilitation into the global trading system and 
integrating the working program for trade facilitation into the national development plan.152 
The IF program has according to its sceptics several shortcomings; budgetary constraints, 
initial program requirements are difficult to reach and limited impact as opposed to its 
expected achievements. In other words, there have not been enough recourses to follow up or 
extend the program for those countries who have faced complications during the process.153 
At the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong 2005, it was decided to enhance the program to 
suit the programs to the LDCs needs and to ensure that the initial goals are reached. The 
Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) is in the process of being finalized.154  
Nevertheless, both advocators and opponents believe that, although there have been severe 
implications with some parts of the technical assistance program/s, special attention must be 
given to the LDCs, especially the LLDCs. It is imperative that the developed countries and 
the emerging countries will continue making special efforts to strengthen the supply of 
assistance to LDCs. Further efforts are necessary in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and 
sustainability for the economic growth of LDCs.155  
 
Lastly, the link between trade facilitation and Aid for Trade needs to be made since the EIF is 
the main mechanism through which least-developed countries access Aid for Trade. Although 
the volume of Aid For Trade-related TA/CB has been increasing steadily since the launch of 
the Doha Round, the need for further assistance has been widely recognized by the 
international community. In December 2005, at the Ministerial Conference held in Hong 
Kong, the EIF was endorsed and a WTO work programme on Aid for Trade was created. 
WTO Members gave mandate to create a Task Force to provide recommendations on how to 
operate Aid for Trade and to consult with Members, international organizations and 
development banks on mechanisms to secure additional financial resources.156 In conjunction 
with trade facilitation measures, the development of infrastructure, including roads, railways, 
ports, bridges and border posts, is needed to successfully build efficient trade systems.157 
However, it is recognized that although Aid for Trade can be a valuable complement to the 
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DDA, it cannot be a substitute for the development benefits that will result from a successful 
conclusion of the Doha Round.158 Even though, the link between trade facilitation and Aid for 
Trade is acknowledged the NGTF does not focus on the subject since there are other forums 
where the issue is negotiated and therefore Aid for Trade will not be further discussed.159 
 
 
3.6 Enforcing Trade Facilitation 
3.6.1 The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
As the examination of the Articles have illustrated, the WTO Members have in theory equal 
rights to use the benefits from trade facilitation but the burden of duties are different 
depending if the Member is a LDC e.g. regarding time frames for implementation. However, 
the burdens are different since the WTO Members have uneven preconditions for 
implementing trade facilitation. One debated topic concerning this has been whether a future 
agreement should mandate the use of the DSM. The DSM is in first place favored by 
advocators of trade facilitation with the argument that all WTO Members regardless of their 
financial status have the right to bring a case to the DSM. However, many LDCs believe that 
the use of DSM will result in unacceptable burdens, since they not yet have the economical or 
technical means to establish platforms for trade facilitation. Furthermore, developing 
countries are less well equipped to participate in the process because they have fewer lawyers 
with the appropriate training and knowledge of regulations, they are less experienced, and 
they can bear fewer financial resources.160  
 
Firstly, a quick review demonstrates that the DSM has some inherent predicaments. When 
dispute arises, or failures to live up to obligations, the complaining party must first request 
bilateral consultations (Article 4 of the DSU). If consultations fail to settle the dispute, the 
complaining party may request the establishment of a panel, which will conduct a report, with 
the exception that the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) decides by consensus not to take action 
(Article 6 of the DSU).161  Within 60 days, the panel report must be adopted, unless a party to 
the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal, or the DSB decides by 
consensus not to adopt the report (Article 16 of the DSU). The special decision-making 
procedure where the DSB must approve the decision unless there is a consensus against it is 
known as “negative” consensus. At first glance, it can seem undemocratic since some 
developed countries can use their bargain power to persuade WTO Members to vote to their 
favor.162 However, to be able to block the decision to adopt report(s) requires all Member 
Sates to join the opposition or at least stay passive. Hence, in practice it is impossible for an 
individual Members State to block important trade issues. On this point, the DSM is “law” 
regulated rather than “power” regulated which give the LDCs, at least in theory, the same 
equal chance of bringing a Member State to court, indifferent to that country’s economical 
power.163    
Appeals to the AB, are limited to issues of law and legal interpretations covered in the panel 
report. When a panel or the AB after examination concludes that a measure is inconsistent 
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with a covered agreement, it must recommend that the member concerned bring its measures 
into conformity with the WTO agreement (Article 19 of the DSU). Article 22 of  the DSU 
states that if a measurement inconsistent with the WTO agreement is not corrected than 
compensation can be obtained. Wealthy complainants can use threat of countermeasures in 
order to induce compliance towards weaker countries that do not have the finance to 
compensate the complainants.164 When acting as defendants, the wealthier part will have the 
possibility of weighting the advantages and disadvantages between changing the domestic 
policies at stake (in order to avoid imposition of countermeasures) or simply keeping the 
domestic policies at stake intact (and see countermeasures imposed against them). 
 
3.6.2 Dispute Settlement Understanding and Developing Countries 
There are a number of provisions in the DSU relating to developing countries, as an effort to 
reduce the imbalances within the DSM. For example, according to Article 4.10 of the DSU, 
WTO Members have to give special attention to the particular problems and interests of 
developing countries in consultations. When considering the appropriate actions that should 
be taken, the DSB is to take into account not only the trade coverage of the measures 
complained of but also their impact on the economy of the developing country that is the 
defendant (Article 21.8 of the DSU). In addition, legal advice to developing countries should 
be facilitated by the WTO secretariat when needed (Article 27.2 of the DSU). Article 24 of 
the DSU states ”at all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute 
settlement procedures involving a least-developed country Member, particular consideration 
shall be given to the special situation of least developed country Members.” This is one of the 
most important provisions, which calls for restraint in invoking the DSU against LDCs, when 
it comes to asking for compensation or in seeking authorization to suspend the application of 
concessions.165  
 
Article 12.11 of the DSU stipulates that where a developing country Member is involved in a 
dispute, the Panel Report is to indicate how SDT provisions have been taken into account. 
This provision, although apparently dependent upon it being raised by the developing country 
Member, nevertheless arguably contains elements that advocate the factor of development 
being taken into consideration in judicial matters.166  
 
The developed countries and those in favors for settling trade facilitation disputes in the 
DSM, usually argue that the actual cases where LDCs have to face the DSM are exaggerated. 
In fact, developed countries are the claimants and respondents in the majority of cases.167 One 
of the strongest reasons for this is because litigation is politically expensive for many high-
income nations since there is a huge reluctance internationally when wealthier governments” 
pick on” poorer countries, accusing them for WTO violations. 
In the practice of WTO dispute settlement, developing Members have invoked the 
“developing condition” or SDT, particularly as a shield as respondents while developed 
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Members have not refrained from challenging the use by developing Members of the 
developing condition as a basis for departures from normal WTO obligations. The developing 
condition has been employed firstly as a relevant factual condition, and secondly as a 
justification for preferential implementation of obligations. The normative framework of the 
WTO allows the “development condition” to be a “justifiable” issue in certain circumstances 
regulated by rules and case law.168  
3.7 Alternative Legal Approaches for Implementing Trade Facilitation  
3.7.1 Multilateral vs. Plurilateral Approach 
In the past, there have been proposals to make the trade facilitation agreement plurilateral. As 
a result, the agreement will only be applicable to those WTO Members who sign the 
agreement. The WTO Members would then be given the choice to agree to new rules on a 
voluntary basis, and all countries would have a say in the negotiating process. Most 
developing countries, however, oppose strongly to the idea of negotiating plurilateral 
agreements. Some developing countries believe that accepting this kind of agreement would 
set an untrustworthy precedent for other issues. Moreover, a plurilateral agreement runs the 
risk of discriminating against non-WTO Members in violation of central WTO principles.169  
 
Another unsettling issue is that plurilateral agreements do not seem to address limited 
capacity and resource constraints in developing countries. Because, the participation is 
voluntary the regulatory provisions might seem excessively burdensome to many LDCs, 
which leads to developed countries as only signatories. Plurilateral agreement can result in 
“lock-in” regulations in a trade facilitation agreement, which will make it difficult for 
developing members to join later on. This given that the agreement will be written by and for 
advanced economies, and may not include appropriate provisions or considerations for 
developing economies. Since, the criticism of the European Commission’s suggestion in 2003, 
to address the Singapore Issues as a plurilateral agreement was vast; no WTO Member has 
represented this approach.170 
 
3.7.2 Bilateral Agreement vs. Multilateral Trade System 
There are also those WTO Members - e.g. US and Japan - that believe that other forms of 
agreements outside the WTO framework, although in accordance with Article XXIV of the 
GATT, could be an alternative to the Doha Round. The alternatives are called bilateral 
agreements and they consist of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs). Those in favor for RTAs argue, “small vulnerable economies should 
undertake a regional approach to the implementation of some expected WTO commitments, 
since they are not able to afford all the material and infrastructure necessary.”171 However, 
many WTO Members, NGOs, economists and politicians believe free trade agreements 
outside WTO’s framework and the Doha Round can jeopardize the entire multilateral trade 
system and result in extensive trade imbalances and trade disturbances.  
 
Bilateralists argue that a regional solution would lead to the WTO Members addressing 
common local transaction costs jointly instead of facing the challenges of implementing trade 
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facilitation on their own. 172  This is primary crucial for LLDCs that are situated in 
geographically demanding areas and are dependent on their neighboring states’ infrastructures. 
Moreover, the proponents mean that there are two main benefits of regional cooperation for 
the sake of trade facilitation; firstly, elimination of duplication and secondly, positive political 
collaboration among the states. Eliminating duplication - as a trade facilitation improvement - 
will enable efficiency gains for companies, but also allow smaller scale operators to access 
export markets, an important aspect for developing countries. Duplication arises because 
similar document requirements must be met repeatedly at the borders, but also because 
national rules differ. Therefore, the search costs and associated uncertainty increases, which 
creates further opportunities for rent seeking and corruption.173 The delivery of services for 
trade transactions - such as insurance, logistics and communication services - can require a 
scale of production beyond the national borders.174  
 
Moreover, RTAs act as trust building mechanism between the governments, favoring 
interactions in shared information and systems. The trust dimension takes an added 
importance regarding security and better border control. Regional representation can also be a 
way to increase the bargaining power of its constituents in international negotiating forums 
such as the WTO.175 On the other side, this form of regionalism may diminish the incentives 
to participate in future multilateral trade negotiations, as countries perceive they have 
sufficient market access and do not want to expose themselves to increased competitive 
pressures from others. 176 
 
Trade facilitation can successfully be implemented in regional agreements such as EU, 
NAFTA and APEC. However, the most important argument to why RTAs are not a long-
lasting solution is because of the nature of trade facilitation is of international harmonization 
while RTAs concentrate on benefits for the region in question. RTAs are in other words, 
contradictory to trade facilitation since they result in several regional areas that all have 
different rules for non-members and thus a stumbling block for fair regionalism. The reason 
for this is only the members of that specific RTA gain benefits that arise from the RTA, other 
duties are applied on imports or exports to other states.177 Moreover, the scope of the RTAs 
are usually more limited and concentrated more on customs clearances and less requirements 
for documentation than administrative corruption, mandatory transport standards and 
arbitration alternatives.  
 
Other issues concerning bilateral agreements come with their choice of partner. According to 
a study (World Bank 2005), with some South-South (S-S) exceptions, the majority of PTAs 
are of the N-S variety.178  Against this background, if trade facilitation is inserted in an 
existing PTA or incorporated in a new agreement, there is a treacherous possibility that the 
weaker party is compelled to extensive administrative improvements without getting the 
financial support or technical assistance necessary from the wealthier counterpart. The same 
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problems comes with RTAs, if not even more immense. The benefits of incorporating trade 
facilitation in RTAs are modest, if the agreements are signed by countries that have more or 
less the same technical and economical situation, e.g. some parts of Africa, Latin America and 
Asia. Then they have to be dependent on those countries in their region that can offer 
technical assistance or economical contribution to work programs, which is a huge burden for 
some emerging countries to bear on their own.179    
 
3.8 Conclusions 
Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT, could be more accurate and precise in their scope and 
application but the proposals previously discussed offers the majority of the WTO Members a 
fair chance to submit their enhancements. Compared to other GATT Articles, e.g. the MFN or 
national treatment, the Articles regulating trade facilitation are not as multifaceted and 
politically sensitive, which serves as an advantage.     
 
Concerning the proposals, some points are worth discussing. First, there is a superstition that 
computerization and Just-In-Time solutions are the resolutions to all the technological 
challenges that the developing countries face. In addition, the WTO should take note of the 
frequent and rapid changes in technology and procedures and avoid agreeing to detailed 
procedures that may become quickly outdated. Moreover, the proposals submitted show that 
several developing countries have been active in developing the modalities of trade 
facilitation to better suit their economical reality.  
 
Many LDCs also have difficulties with inadequate legislation that makes it complicated to 
introduce changes that the submitted proposals require for adjusting to entire new ways of 
doing business, e.g. e-business. Outdated and corrupted customs and border authorities make 
it complicated to introduce changes, e.g. the Single Window system, that requires profound 
co-operation between all governmental authorities. Another intricacy is the lack of educated 
and experienced personnel to facilitate improvements. However, these are all issues that can 
be addressed by technical assistance programs if they are adopted after the receiving states’ 
individual conditions.  
      
Trade facilitation’s negotiation history illustrates that SDT and technical assistance have been 
two of the greatest concerns of the LDCs. It is evident that although they agree that trade 
facilitation results in economical and political benefits, the implementation issue will continue 
influencing the negotiations to come. Technical assistance is at the moment not an 
unconditional right for the LDCs to exploit and although, the IF program for example have 
been less successful than expected, it is crucial to reflect the situation for many LDCs if the 
assistance would not be offered at first place. If the technical assistance is concentrated on a 
country’s specific circumstances, instead of using “one size fit all” system, the outcome 
would probably be of better quality. Moreover, it is important that the requirements and level 
of assistance given to the countries will not be based on the political and economical interest 
of the donors but the needs of the developing countries. Otherwise there is a risk that 
regionalism becomes a stumbling block for those regions that need the assistance the most.   
The economical sponsoring that is attached to the technical assistance programs could become 
a setback since many donor countries are struggling with their own problems in times of 
financial crisis.  
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Nevertheless, WTO Members e.g. Spain illustrates through an offered donation to the 
DDAGTF, that trade facilitation concerns are still on the international trade agenda in a long-
term perspective. The most efficient effort is questionably to change the provisions regulating 
SDT and technical assistance from soft law instruments to hard law obligations. However, 
this requires both institutional and political efforts that are impossible, not to mention the 
judicial implications. Although, it can be argued that in some parts it is a rightful demand 
from the LDCs it would be jeopardizing the political will that many developed countries and 
other donors have shown. Until the DDA’s legitimacy is not apparent, there is no point in 
forcing further obligations and duties on the developed countries otherwise this can result in 
reluctance even for trade facilitation. Lastly, the link between trade facilitation and Aid for 
Trade should be bared in mind; however, it is a complement and not an alternative to trade 
facilitation. At the same token, as long as the trade facilitation negotiations are moving 
forward there is no reason to lift the subject from the DDA and make it to an independent 
development package or development plan. 
 
LDCs have shown unwillingness to whether the agreement should mandate the use of the 
DSM. The DSM is arguably being an unfair institution where the LDCs face obstacles such as 
financial and judicial discrepancy. To this end, it is important to keep in mind the magnitude 
of having the right to exploit a dispute mechanism for all parties involved regardless of their 
financial position. In fact, the mere existence of a compulsory multilateral settlement system 
is in itself a benefit for developing countries. It is true that in practice, it is more burdensome 
for LDCs to utilize the system, however, the DSU offers less burdensome obligations to them 
additional to the right to judicial assistance. However, unless Member States have an 
opportunity to legally examine the judicial inaccuracies that occurred in the international 
trading system, the risk is that the whole WTO is deteriorated as a multilateral trading 
organization.180Although, the provisions do not solve the existing democratic discrepancy, 
there are clearly more favorable arguments to maintain a “rule regulated” system than a 
“power regulated”, which would probably be the case outside the WTO’s framework.  
 
Regarding the plurilateral approach, there is no urgent need of implementing trade facilitation 
as a plurilateral agreement since there are still good prospects that the Doha Round will be 
concluded. Given that plurilateral agreements are under the WTO’s framework it would be 
counteractive to elevate a subject like trade facilitation under negotiations in the Doha Round, 
to become a separate agreement. The Doha negotiations have to be encouraged in all possible 
ways - a plurilateral agreement will eliminate trade facilitation from the multilateral trade 
agenda. The same goes for bilateral agreements. 
 
Generally, regarding bilateral agreements, it has to be said that they can in theory provide 
LDCs with a voice they otherwise lack in multilateral trade negotiations. Developing 
countries can develop RTAs to express their collective will, campaign against global and 
regional measures that conflict with their own immediate interests and they can build trading 
blocs to empower their economies. However, the advantages with regionalism are generally 
conditioned to the correct trade partner/s where the power balance and the conditions of the 
RTA are equivalent. Unfortunately, more frequently, that has not been the case and many 
developing countries find themselves entrapped in disproportionate PTAs and RTAs. There 
are apparent disadvantages when bilateral mechanisms are adopted in an increasing pace, as a 
means of substituting the multilateral trade processes. The development of bilateral trade 
agreements arguably has discouraged some States, especially the U.S. but also free trade 
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advocates such as Colombia and South Korea, from engaging themselves to find consensus in 
multilateral negotiations. 
 
RTAs and PTAs have the type of shortcomings - e.g. their limited scope and their unbalanced 
trading agreements both within and towards non-members - that are incompatible to the aims 
of trade facilitation and opponent to the WTO system as a whole. Trade facilitation should not 
become the scope of RTAs or PTAs as an alternative to multilateral obligations since it could 
lead to a leeway for allowing other subjects on the DDA find bilateral solutions. If some of 
the WTO Members want to complement their RTAs with trade facilitation provisions or 
incorporate them in new RTAs, WTO cannot prevent them but it is crucial that the WTO 
keeps encouraging the WTO Members to participate in the Doha negotiations. Even 
committed multilateralists have to conclude that the current flood of PTA activity is probably 
not reversible. This puts the pressure on WTO to guarantee that the multilateral system has an 
effective mechanism to ensure the compatibility of PTAs with WTO law, which can be 
difficult to handle when they are increasing rapidly.  
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4. POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL REVIEW OF TRADE 
FACILITATION 
 
The WTO Members seem to agree on the benefits of trade facilitation but many of the 
implications are mainly concerns for the LDCs and especially the LLDC, which have limited 
financial or technical possibilities to implement trade facilitation in their economies. Only 
general topics concerning mainly the developing countries are examined since it is 
impracticable to study the consequences of all the proposals submitted. 
 
 
4.1 The Benefits of Improved Trade Facilitation 
4.1.1 Economical profits 
Although, the relationships between trade facilitation, trade flows, and capacity building are 
complex and challenging to measure, there have been several studies made by the 
international and regional organizations concerning the financial economics benefits that trade 
facilitation accommodate. One often-quoted figure is global gains of 40 billion USD from just 
a 1% reduction in trade transaction costs.181  
 
Another often-cited study (World Bank 2004) examined 75 countries and estimated the 
relationship between trade facilitation and global trade flows in manufactured goods in 2000-
2001, to be able to calculate the economic revenues that had been gained. The study 
considered four important categories: port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory 
environment, and service sector infrastructure. The results suggest that both imports and 
exports domestically and internationally could increase with improvements in the mentioned 
trade facilitation areas. In total, the economic gain in trade flow from trade facilitation 
improvements was estimated to be 377 billion USD. The economists argue that the results 
suggest that improvements in trade facilitation would do more to stimulate trade than further 
tariff liberalization. 182   
 
In global trade, seventy-five percent of the transactions costs are due to administrative 
obstacles - numerous customs procedures, tax procedures and cargo inspections - even before 
the products are being imported or exported.183  The problems are magnified for LLDCs, 
whose exporters need to comply with different requirements at each border but also because 
of their time-sensitive products like agricultural goods, which stand for one of the LDCs’ 
most vital import products. At the same time studies show that countries with longer delays 
are associated with relatively lower exports of time-sensitive goods.184 In other words, trade 
facilitation will generate benefits that are more economical for the LDCs when the trade 
transport times become more effective. Studies estimate that each additional day that a 
product is delayed prior to being shipped trade is reduced by more than one percent.185  
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An additional study from the World Bank (2006), which looks at the administrative 
requirements for exporting and importing a standardized cargo of goods with every official 
procedure counted along with the time necessary for completion, illustrates the situation in the 
world at the time being. Not surprisingly, the developed countries have the more effective 
procedures and less transactions costs. On the question, why the average transactions costs for 
the countries are lower when it comes to export costs it is argued that the volume of trade may 
directly affect trade costs.186 Thus, the marginal value of investment in trade facilitation may 
be higher when the trade volume is large and since many developed countries export more 
than they import, their export costs are lower. However, it becomes evident that the document 
requirements and the high costs are, although of different magnitude, a general problem for 
the majority of the countries. This could be one of the reasons to why the support for trade 
facilitation is strong not only among the developing countries but also among the developed 
countries; they are realizing the benefits although they have proficient trade systems.  
 
Various Trade Facilitation Metrics by Region or Country187  
 
Region or              Doc for Export       Time for export    Cost to Export     Doc for import    Time for import     Cost to import 
Economy                    (number)                 (days)            (US$/container)         (number)                (days)          (US$/container)          
 
 
All Countries      7.0                     26.1                 $1,230                   7.8                  29.7                     $1,412 
 
Singapore (Best)           4.0                     5.0                   $416                      4.0                    3.0                        $367 
 
Kazakhstan (Worst)    12.0                     89.0                 $2,730                 14.0                  76.0                     $2,780 
  
East Asia & Pacific      6.9                     24.5                  $885                     7.5                   25.8                     $1,015 
 
Eastern Europe & 
 
Central Asia     7.0                      29.3                  $1,393                  8.3                  30.8                      $1,551 
 
Latin America & 
 
Caribbean                     6.7                      22.6                 $1,096                   7.7                  24.0                     $1,208 
 
Middle East & 
 
North Africa                 7.1                      24.8                 $992                      8.0                  28.7                     $1,129 
 
OECD                           4.5                      9.8                   $905                      5.0                 10.4                        $986 
 
South Asia                    8.6                      32.5                 $1,180                   9.1                 32.1                      $1,418 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa      8.1                      35.6                 $1,660                   9.0                 43.7                      $1,986 
 
Sweden                         4.0                      8.0                   $ 697                     3.0                   6.0                        $ 735 
United States                4.0                       6.0                  $960                      5.0                   5.0                      $1,160 
 
Figure 2.188 
 
Trade facilitation reforms are as mentioned not only for developing countries; they are also 
crucial to the U.S. and other strong economic countries. At present, the U.S. but also the EU, 
performs not as good as the emerging countries simply because these countries are building 
technically advanced infrastructures instead of depredating on a drained infrastructure in need 
of reparations, which is the case for some developed countries like Italy and Greece. One 
recent study (World Bank 2006), suggests that a one-day improvement in the average time it 
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takes to move U.S. cargo from a warehouse to the port and cargo from the port to a domestic 
warehouse could increase U.S. trade by almost 29 billion USD per year.189 
 
The LDCs greatest concern is the short-term and administrative difficulty of implementing 
obligation arising out of negotiations. The WTO Members altogether, more or less, believe 
that the solution is TA/CB, which is an integral part of a future agreement under the WTO 
legal framework. There are, nonetheless, different believes on the extent of the assistance. The 
main argument, however, is that many expenses are short-terms and will later generate a large 
amount of state revenue. Chile, an often-cited example, reformed its customs systems in the 
beginning of 2001, with a cost of 5 million USD but it took less than one year to recoup the 
expenditure. The benefits included a 75% drop in the average processing time and big 
reduction costs for both to the government, business and ultimately the customers. UNECE 
have reported similar experience in Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Panama.190    
 
Lastly, although trade facilitation generate economical benefits as the impact of climate 
changes has become more evident voices have been raised that more focus should be on the 
environment problems involved. The consequences of more frequent transactions that can be 
a result of the logistical and administrative progress made by trade facilitation can lead to 
environmental implications. Not so much the actual measures of trade facilitation itself but its 
trade efficiency can result in air, water and noise pollution and emissions as it becomes 
cheaper and easier to import and export.191 Environmental issues are questions that both the 
developing and developed countries try to avoid, and no official study has been arranged by 
the WTO to examine the environmental impacts on some of the subjects set on the DDA. It is 
however recognized that is can constitute implications and become more costly than first 
expected.192     
 
 
4.1.2 Promotion of Democratic Institutions 
Trade facilitation can in addition to spurring trade and economic development have a positive 
effect on government institutions. Recent developments in the customs and border agencies of 
some developed countries illustrate the progress. Key to the changes has been the 
development of a working partnership between customs administrations and traders. With 
increasing frequency, customs consulted closely with industry advisory groups when 
considering new programs and other modernizing changes. Many economists argue that the 
success lies in reducing government controls and instead working closer with the business 
community to comprehend the reforms that are needed to be made for efficient trade 
facilitation. It is furthermore argued that development of a functioning partnership with the 
trading community and other stakeholders would result in less intrusive but more effective 
border agency regulation and additional improvements in trade facilitation. In developing 
countries ruled by authoritarian regimes, this could then become an immense precedent for 
the development of democratic institutions. 193 Representatives from the LDCs and NGOs, 
however, disagree with too extensively deregulation. Although cooperation between the state 
authorities and the business community could be prosperous, there needs to be a control 
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system, which enables the governments to prevent unfair political influence, negative 
consequences on the local companies and monopolistic practices from powerful companies.194    
 
Governments can also gain social benefits by increased revenue and lower trade costs, 
because of trade facilitation. Thereby, governments can increase outflows in priority areas 
such as health and education.195  It is also argued that the governments get an increased 
transparency and predictability in their trade systems with the legal harmonization that trade 
facilitation brings.  
 
 
4.1.3 Collaboration between International Organizations 
The important role of the international organizations in the filed of trade facilitation have 
already been explained. The collaboration is crucial for the financing, studying, planning and 
implementing of trade facilitation. Among these organizations IMF, World Bank, WCO, UN 
and UNCTAD have observer status at both General Council and Council for Trade in Goods, 
the latter being responsible for trade facilitation.196 In that way, the organizations can follow 
the discussions, reporting and some negotiations that are important for their work. 
 
IMF and the World Bank are mainly responsible for financing the different trade facilitation 
projects. WCO and UNCTAD can offer their expertise and knowledge regarding TA/CB. The 
United Nations Convention on Transit Trade in Land Locked Countries from 1965 also 
promotes trade facilitation. The convention requires countries to attempt using simplified 
documentation and expeditious methods about customs clearance procedures to transit trade 
for the whole transit journey within their territory.197 
 
4.1.4 Collaboration with the Business Community 
The fact that intergovernmental organizations and many governments have existing and long 
lasted collaboration with the trade community illustrates that it has already been recognized 
that business is a valid and valuable partner in achieving mutual aims. Collaboration between 
the parties can function as a resource to achieve progress in trade facilitation. The reasons for 
the business community’s involvement and assistance to the government can be explained in 
five means. First, the business community has firsthand experience, which enables them to 
compare the relative successes of different customs’ systems in the world. In that way, 
companies can assist in properly identifying problems, which is the first step to finding the 
best solutions. Second, good relations with the traders and the state authorities will result in 
mutually compatible processes and agreed standards that will increase compliance at costs to 
business and governments. Since, new requirements and standards are likely to be costly, 
although the costs will be regained when the systems are established, dialogue can be an 
incentive for the collaboration and a way to overcome resistance. 198  Third, the business 
community can share its expertise and information on technology, logistics process and data 
management. In so doing, governments can better keep pace with the latest developments in 
business practices and technology tools. In addition, the collaboration can encourage foreign 
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investments. Finally, business can help by providing practical assistance with technological 
systems or by participating in training programs in developing countries.199 The benefits for 
the business community are lower costs and fewer delays, faster customs clearance, 
transparency in the system and thud a more effortless commercial framework for doing both 
domestic and international trade. 
 
The main benefit for developing countries is that their Small and Medium size Enterprises 
(SMEs), can gain extensive business opportunity and new markets. Their SMEs can operate 
beyond the domestic markets, which increase the developing countries revenues. This since 
SMEs, in general constitute, a more significant share of the business sector in developing 
economies than of developed economies. Trade obstructions in turn normally constitute a 
larger share of SMEs’ costs than of larger companies that have the capital to investment.200 
 
Apart from gains of cost savings and utilizing business opportunities, trade facilitation and 
especially electronic business will create new business openings in a way that is impossible 
through the existing transport systems in developing countries.201  Concerns are, however, 
raised that MNCs massive financial strength, access to technology and sophisticated IT 
infrastructure make it difficult if not impossible, for developing country traders (mostly SMEs 
and even smaller companies) to catch up with the trade facilitation improvements - or in some 
sectors even to compete with them in their domestic markets.202  
 
4.2 Implications of Trade Facilitation Improvements  
4.2.1 Administrative Corruption 
A central obstacle to improved trade facilitation in many developing countries is 
administrative corruption. Unofficial payments to governmental agencies, such as the customs 
and the border officials, constitute a substantial transport cost in many countries with limited 
governmental control. Indirect payments for “facilitation services” such as fees for unofficial 
police escorts, documents requirements with multiple signatures and unofficial checkpoints 
where payments are taken from truckers, are all examples of administrative corruption that 
hinders the trade flow and trade efficiency.203    
 
Another type of corruption is “facilitation services”, which is payments where a trader asks 
customs officials to reduce tax liability or to turn a blind eye to smuggling or other illegal 
operations. These kinds of payments are a huge threat, not only to the trade, but also 
politically and socially. A study from the World Bank (2008) show that in states where trade 
facilitation is discouraged investments is lower that in states that offer a safer trade 
environment.204  In other words, countries with inadequate trade infrastructure, complicated 
regulation such as extensive document requirements and corruption, are less capable of 
benefiting from the opportunities of expanding global trade.  
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Delays and non-transparency in determining the classification and value of merchandise, 
physical inspections of all cargo irrespective of risk and the operation of border posts for only 
a limited number of hours and frequent closings are other examples of difficulties hinders 
successful trade facilitation. Moreover, some governments and customs administrations are 
committed to a system of unofficial payments covertly and overtly oppose trade facilitation 
improvements because of their importance for the state’s income. These problems are 
fundamental problems that must be addressed jointly by policy officials, business interests, 
international donors and others seeking to improve trade facilitation.205    
 
 
4.2.2 Revenue Collection and Tax Farming 
Revenue collection by customs and other border agencies is a critical part of the national 
revenue for many countries, especially LDCs. The heavy reliance of some countries on 
revenues collected by customs has resulted in draconian measures to prevent smuggling and 
corruption, while for the emerging countries there are political measures taken to try to 
prevent corruption. For example, in the Republic of Georgia, there is a ‘Fiscal Police’ that 
check the work of customs officers in clearing merchandise and collecting duties and taxes. If 
any irregularities are discovered, severe penalties are imposed and it has made a difference.206 
If trade facilitation was stronger in countries such as Georgia the reliance on control systems, 
could be less and instead become a part of the custom’s working environment. 
 
Modern ‘tax farming’ involves governments contracting out the assessment and collection of 
import duties and taxes to private companies called ‘tax farmers’. These are paid a percentage 
of the revenue collected for their services. The private inspections can result in longer 
processing times and increased costs for exports and imports if the taxing system used is not 
properly designed and administered. There are no real guarantees that the companies are using 
the most efficient systems available, as the transparency for the governmental authorities that 
rent the services, is in very limited scale.  
 
 
4.2.3 The Role of the Government 
The quality of governance and the related issue of corruption are also important determinants 
of transaction costs, time, and the level of predictability. The engagement of top leadership is 
essential to driving the investment necessary to make changes in the field of international 
trade and development. According to international studies, countries where corruption is 
institutionalized appear to have greater frictions in their logistics environments and will have 
greater problems to implement trade facilitation. Preventing corruption in the customs 
systems requires comprehensive, systematic and coordinated work of international and 
regional organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). More importantly, 
governments have through legal, political and economical measures facilitate the essential 
changes into their national systems, after their own specific conditions.207  
  
Developed countries that advocate for privatization and liberalization argue that the 
governments are the driving force when it comes to create conductive and competitive trade 
environment. However, it is important to emphasize that trade liberalization should only be 
accepted to that extent which enables the governments to exercise control and transparency in 
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their domestic markets. Otherwise, there is a risk that the international trade system endangers 
its legitimacy, since many developing countries are hesitant to open their markets to TNC.208 
The majority of the LDCs are corrupt mainly because they are in national or regional conflicts. 
These countries especially need trade assistance, to reform institutional structures, build 
proficient infrastructures, create technological trade systems and educate human capital 
working in customs and border authorities.209 In order to achieve these results, considerable 
time, effort and resources from WTO and other international organizations are crucial.   
 
4.2.4 Security in the Supply Chain 
Trade facilitation have some elements of security initiatives, however, striving to increase 
security and to impose trade procedural simplifications are not mutually exclusive but can, in 
fact, support each other. 210  The initiatives to improve security in the supply chain on 
international as well as regional levels were made after the attacks on September 11, 2001. 
Although, WTO does not have work program for security efforts, it has emphasized the 
importance of proceeding with the initiatives.211 The initiatives are related to the risks of 
future terrorist attacks directed at the supply chain in various forms, although they have not 
yet taken place. To illustrate the complexity of international supply chains, the figure 
illustrates the various parties involved and the different activities. 212 
 
 
Figure 1. The activity diagram is a simplified diagram of a ship situation, showing the 
most basic process involve.213 
 
The reasons to why international supply chain is vulnerable lay in the different activities, 
which the trading parties have to handle large amounts of goods and information. Moreover, 
the supply chain consists of many occasions where goods must be reloaded; a product is 
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produced, sold and transported to a company, which in turn sells it onwards in the chain.214 
Threats in the supply chain can be described as aircraft that are used as weapons or containers 
used as a mode of transport for heavy arms and drug smuggling. Another problem is the 
increased hijacking, often on the roads or by sea.215   
 
To be able to coordinate security in the international supply chain, harmonized and 
compatible systems are essential. The costs that can arise with the introduction of stricter 
rules for security ultimately are introduction of new routines, the acquisition of new 
equipment, education of the personnel and the certification fee itself.  In addition, after these 
measures have been implemented, there are still the regular costs of work on security. The 
main positive side is benefits arising from a reduction in the number of controls, better 
relations with the customs and other trade authorities, a reduction in thefts and shrinkage, and 
lastly the possibility of having lower insurance premiums.216 The most important organization 
working with this kind of questions now is WCO but the WTO is recognizes its importance.  
 
At the local or regional level, the threats or risks of terrorism can have the effect that 
companies move their operations to safer areas. Moreover, investments are affected, which 
affects the possibility of achieving economic growth. Even if it is difficult to assess the risks 
of an attack, this constitutes a strong incentive to make efforts to secure the international 
supply chain against possible attacks in the future. Increased security can lead to improving 
trade facilitation, which in turn, increases trade. However, there is a risk that intensified 
security requirements for customs clearance will slow down the supply chain. Longer 
transport times at sea or by road ultimately mean both an increase in storage costs and 
depreciation of the value of the product.217  
 
4.3 Conclusions 
There are obvious advantages with trade facilitation as a trade and development promoter. 
The economical benefits even proceeds further tariff reductions under the Doha Round. Trade 
facilitation can also encourage the democratic process to reach just political and social 
regimes in the developing countries. The gains should, however, not be exaggerated since 
corruption and governmental autocracy requires years to dissolve. Nevertheless, collaboration 
between domestic authorities and governments, together with harmonization of the 
administrative procedures that trade facilitation requires, are vital benefits for LDCs. Other 
gains are transparency and predictability for the national government, other WTO Members 
and the business community.   
 
The efforts made by the international organizations in the field of trade facilitation could be 
one of the most important reasons to why success can be achieved. Although, the legal 
framework is in some parts restricted to WTO, the UN bodies are an important incentive for 
developing countries to accept the enrolment in e.g. the EIF program. Many developing 
countries still have a strong belief in the UN, compared to the IMF or World Bank, which 
benefits trade facilitation in the long run. Moreover, these organizations can cooperate with 
local and regional organizations for the implementation or study of trade facilitation.  
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If trade facilitation is implemented rightfully, it can become beneficiary to the business 
community on an international as well as national level. Presumably, since SMEs are more 
common in developing countries, and since the businesses typically have fewer resources than 
those in advanced countries, trade facilitation could help the developing countries’ businesses 
to generate greater trade revenues. Although, all form of cooperation between the national 
governments and the business community is appreciated, a clear distinction on the judicial, 
political and economical command is crucial when it comes to the market access that MNCs 
still can get through the benefits of trade facilitation. The national government should be in 
charge of the judicial and political conditions that foreign companies should comply after, as 
long as they are consistence with WTO law, and not be affected by powerful MNCs with 
strong economical agendas.  
 
To summarize there are several advantages that support trade facilitation in an international 
context. However, there are issues that might demand more financial support, technical 
assistance and political collaboration to overcome. Administrative corruption, revenue 
collection and tax farming are some of the phenomena that exist in the developing counties, 
which require more time and support than the technical assistance programs calculate. 
However, it is only fair to recognize that many LDCs and developing countries have 
regulations and policies against the illegal activities but they have difficulties to cope with the 
problems. This illustrates that there is a political will in some countries but that there still 
exists an obvious need of assistance to incorporate effective policies. Unfortunately, 
irregularities exist everywhere - perhaps more but in a sophisticated manner in democratic 
countries - so in practice these issues involve all WTO Members and should be solved 
collectively.  
 
Increased transparency and efficiency of customs procedures and border procedures are thus 
policies that most WTO Members would find desirable to implement. Administrative 
corruption should be confronted by investments in human resources, adoption of more precise 
managements systems and management control. Regarding some WTO Members’ concern 
that trade facilitation measures will reduce customs or fiscal revenue, is not accurate. Trade 
facilitation does not mean making illegal activities, e.g. tariff avoidance, easier. Rather, it 
means that the more efficient control systems are implemented the less complicates 
administrative procedures will be rendered which generates more business transactions. 
 
It is evident that security in the international supply chain is an important initiative that must 
be taken serious. The number of security initiatives are steadily increasing shows that there is 
an interest among decision-makers, administrators, and the business community to organize 
security systems with efficient trade. Although it is complex to provide a clear-cut picture of 
the ways in which they affect trade, globally or in different regions and the economical costs 
involved, the WTO should encourage these types of incentives. However, the incentives 
should be appropriate to the longer transport times and increased storage costs that the 
security measures bring. 
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5. FINAL REMARKS 
 
Trade facilitation has the potential to go far beyond simply growth in trade volumes. By 
boosting efficiency, strengthening governance, and increasing transparency in government 
administration, facilitation initiatives can fundamentally build a more balanced trade 
environment for the developing countries. An effective trade facilitation agreement is the first 
step towards implementing trade facilitation globally. Given the integrated and global nature 
of the supply chain and the required measures taken to implement trade facilitation, a 
multilateral agreement provide a framework for addressing crosscutting trade issues 
additional to garner cooperation of the international trading community, border authorities 
and the business community. 
 
5.1 The Institutional Dimension 
The WTO has the best position to oversee the implementation and enforcement of trade 
facilitation. It is clear that the WTO has a democratic deficit, especially when it comes to the 
unequal barging power that have been demonstrated at the Green Room meetings, but it does 
offers the same participation possibilities for all its members. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
WTO is dependent on other international organizations and their completion to WTO law in 
order to finance, study and implement trade facilitation. This does not challenge the fact that 
trade facilitation should be primary implemented under the WTO framework. A WTO 
agreement on trade facilitation would, however, not replace other instruments that address 
elements of trade facilitation. While Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT highlight the 
formalities and procedures for movement of goods, as well as publication and administration 
of trade regulations, the Kyoto Convention for example, provides a practical guidelines for 
their implementation. The incorporation of the international soft law instruments could thus 
help raise and facilitate performance levels. 
 
In the light of the criticism that the WTO has endured during the years, without questioning 
the authenticity of the allegations, it is also necessary to consider the counterfactual: how 
would/will trade policies have evolved/progress, in the absence of the WTO? Even if when its 
shortcomings are taken into consideration, the multilateral system is to prefer over regional or 
preferential alternatives.  
 
The famous philosopher Bertrand Russell once said; “organizations are of two kinds, those 
which aim at getting something done, and those which aim at preventing something from 
being done”.  Only time will tell what the future holds for the WTO but hopefully it will 
continue getting things done; changing the unequal trade balances and promoting economic 
growth and development to the world community.  
 
5.2 The Judicial Dimension 
Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT offer equal benefits as the result of trade facilitation but 
the duties to reach them are different. SDT and trade assistance offers less burdensome 
implementation obligations for the LDCs, however, the efficiency of the systems are limited 
since they are not of binding nature. Considering the difficulties that the Doha Round faces it 
is not appropriate to change the entire mandate for trade facilitation. Having the imbalanced 
trade positions in mind, however, reformation of the SDT and TACP programs so that they 
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comply with the LDCs needs are necessary and binding commitments are a way of 
safeguarding them. The question is when the problems are being dealt with if not under the 
negotiations that set the modalities for trade facilitation years to come. 
 
Trade facilitation must be implemented under a multilateral agreement; a plurilateral 
agreement is doomed to fail and has small validity amongst the LDCs. PTAs and RTAs could 
play and complementary role to a multilateral agreement, however, they should not replace a 
multilateral agreement as long as the chances to achieve a successful Doha Round are realistic. 
Fundamentally, the resort to PTAs and RTAs should not be encouraged by the WTO since the 
RTAs in general are not between equal trading parties and technical assistance or other 
support cannot be guaranteed at all times. Although, SDT and trade assistance are not legally 
binding, the incentives to compliance are higher and more proficient under a multilateral 
system than under the majority of the bilateral systems.  
 
However, although the MTS might prevail as the judicial institution the time to come - 
whether it is through hard law or soft law instruments - the current trade agenda will continue 
to be discussed and complex issues are remained to be solved. The reason for this is that the 
Member States have dissimilar ideas on the appropriate approaches on how to “cut through 
the red tapes”. Trade facilitation consists of many detailed and complicated procedures that 
need to be compromised on and settled around, but there exist no incentives for lifting trade 
facilitation from the DDA in order to create a separate agreement. At least not as long as there 
are good chances to conclude the round successfully. As long as the negotiations are moving 
forward, there is no need to shift to other alternatives and jeopardize the progress made in the 
field.      
  
5.3 The Policy Dimension 
The fact that trade facilitation result in economical benefits for all the WTO Members, even 
the developed countries, is an imperative incentive for all the WTO Members to work for 
trade facilitation. Overall, the advantages on an economical and political level exceed the 
disadvantages and this is widely recognized by the WTO Members, NGOs and scholars. For 
the WTO Members the issue at stake is the implementation difficulties of trade facilitation 
rather than the questioning of its positive outcome. If an equal trade balance is not obtained 
and if the LDCs continue not to get the same access to the world markets under their own 
conditions the chances are that poverty in LDCs will deepen resulting in secondary problems 
such as increase of armed conflicts, flows of refugees and social degradations. 
 
Security in the supply chain and the environmental issues are two aspects that most likely will 
be more linked with trade facilitation in the future. Although, they are both imperative 
subjects for international trade and development their actual importance will continue to be 
restrictive until the implementation issues of trade facilitation are dealt with in future 
negotiations.  
 
5.4 Future Outlook  
The failure in Geneva 2008 seems not to have had any devastating consequences for 
international trade transactions nor has is been the starting point for the WTO’s dispatch. 
Business as usual appears to be the case although this is a far too simple explanation of the 
current situation; the difficulties with concluding the Doha Round are affecting the legitimacy 
of the MTS. Even though, it is evident that the WTO Members will not give up WTO - the 
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same way as the shortcomings of the UN do not lead to its termination - it is important to 
understand the seriousness of the current situation. Trade between countries will obviously 
continue regardless of the WTO’s existence. The question is rather what kind of judicial 
system and trade conditions the world community wishes to comply and respect.    
 
The multilateral trading system is at a crossroads and it is of great importance that the system 
remains it legitimacy otherwise the chances are that bilateral agreements turn the international 
trade balance even more unequal as well as convoluted. The importance of the Doha Round is 
primary the fact that a completed agreement will come to dictate the conditions for the world 
trade at least for a decade - if not longer - to come. Thus, it is vital that the Doha Round, trade 
facilitation specifically, ends in a rightful agreement rather than just an agreement. The 
question seems to be when, rather than if, the Doha Round will be concluded and trade 
facilitation implemented around the world. However, the question of the concrete scope and 
enhancement of a future agreement due to the delicate judicial, political and nonetheless the 
economical situation, remains to be answered the years to come. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proposals concerning Article V 
GATT: Freedom of Transit218 
 
M. MATTERS                                                 
RELATED TO GOODS TRANSIT      
  
1. Non-Discrimination and Policy Objectives 
(a) Strengthened  Non- discrimination                                            
(b) Legitimate Policy Objective 
Guarantee System                                                 
                    
Proposal submitted by: Cuba, Armenia, EU,  
Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Paraguay, 
Moldovia, Rwanda and Switzerland.            
  
2. Disciplines on Fees and Charges 
(a) Publication of Fees and Charges and 
Prohibition of Unpublished Ones 
(b) Periodic Review of Fees and Charges 
(c) More effective Disciplines on Charges  
for Transit – Reduction/Simplification 
(d) Periodic Exchange between Neighbouring  
Authorities 
Armenia, EU, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, Paraguay, Moldovia, Rwanda and 
Switzerland.   
 
3. Disciplines on Transit Formalities and  
Documentation Requirements 
(a) Publication 
(b) Periodic Review 
(c) Reduction/Simplification 
(d) Harmonization/Standardization 
(e) Promotion of Regional Transit Arrangements  
(f) Simplified and Preferential Clearance for  
Certain Goods 
(g) Limitation of Inspections and Controls 
(h) Sealing 
(i) Cooperation and Coordination on Document  
Requirements 
(j) Monitoring 
(k) Bonded Transport Regime and Guarantees/ 
International, Regional or National Custom 
Armenia, EU, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, Paraguay, Moldovia, Rwanda and 
Switzerland. 
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4. Improved Coordination and Cooperation 
(a) Amongst Authorities 
(b) Between Authorities and the Private Sector 
Armenia, EU, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, Paraguay, Moldovia, Rwanda and 
Switzerland.   
 
5. Operationalization and Clarification 
of Terms 
Armenia, EU, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan,, 
Mongolia, Paraguay, Moldovia, Rwanda and 
Switzerland. 
 
6. Quota-free Transit Regime 
Turkey and Georgia.
 Proposals concerning Article VIII 
GATT: Fees and Formalities 
connected with Importation and 
Exportation 
 
G. FEES AND CHARGES  CONNECTED 
WITH  IMPORTATION AND 
EXPORTATION         
 
1. General Disciplines on Fees and Charges 
Imposed on or in Connection with 
Importation and Exportation  
(a) Specific Parameters for Fees/Charges 
(b) Publication/Notification of Fees/Charges 
(c) Prohibition of Collection of Unpublished Fees 
and Charges* 
 (d) Periodic Review of Fees/Charges 
(e) Automated Payment 
EU, Korea and Switzerland. 
                                                 
2. Reduction/Minimization of the Number  
and Diversity of Fees/Charges 
 
H.  FORMALITIES CONNECTED WITH  
IMPORTATION AND EXPORTATION 
 
1. Disciplines on Formalities/ Procedures and 
Data Documentation Requirements 
Connected with Importation and Exportation  
(a) Non-discrimination  
Hong Kong, China, Switzerland. 
(b) Periodic Review of Formalities and 
Requirements 
Hong Kong, China, Switzerland. 
(c) Reduction/Limitation of Formalities and 
Documentation  
Requirements 
Hong Kong, China, Switzerland. 
(d) Use of International Standards 
Mongolia, Norway, South Africa and 
Switzerland. 
(e) Uniform Customs Code 
(f)  Acceptance of Commercially Available 
Information and of Copies 
(g) Automation 
(h) Single Window / One-time Submission 
Korea. 
(i) Elimination of Pre-Shipment Inspection 
(j) Phasing out Mandatory Use of Customs 
Brokers 
EU, Mongolia, Chinese Taipei and Switzerland. 
(k) Same Border Procedures Within a Customs 
Union 
India. 
(l) Testing Methods Based on Specific Product 
Features 
(m) Uniform Forms and Documentation 
Requirements  
Relating to Import Clearance within a Customs 
Union 
India. 
(n) Option to Return rejected Goods to the 
Exporter 
India. 
 
I. CONSULARIZATION 
 
1. Prohibition of Consular Transaction 
Requirement  
Uganda and the U.S. 
 
J. BORDER AGENCY COOPERATION 
 
1. Coordination of  
Activities and Requirements of all Border 
Agencies  
Canada. 
 
K. RELEASE AND CLEARANCE OF 
GOODS 
 
1. Expedited/Simplified Release and 
Clearance of Goods  
(a) Pre-arrival Processing 
Hong-Kong, China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia and 
Switzerland. 
(b) Expedited Shipments 
The U.S. 
(c) Risk Management / Analysis, Authorized 
Traders  
EU, China and Switzerland, US, India, Korea, 
Indonesia, Canada and Switzerland. 
(d) Post-clearance Audit 
China, Indonesia and Korea. 
(e) Separating Release from Clearance 
Procedures*  
Canada and Switzerland. 
(f) Other Measures to Simplify Customs Release 
and Clearance*  
 
L.TARIFF CLASSIFICATION 
 
1. Objective Criteria for Tariff Classification 
New Zealand. 
 
* Some proposals relating to Article X. 
 Proposals concerning Article X 
GATT: Publication and 
Administration of Trade 
Regulations 
A. PUBLICATION AND AVAILABILITY 
OF INFORMATION 
1. Publication and Notification of Trade 
Regulations and of Penalty Provisions  
Article X with some proposals also relating to 
Art. VIII  
Japan, Mongolia and Switzerland) 
 
2. Internet Publication 
Turkey. 
(a) Internet "publication" of the elements set out 
in the Article. 
(b) Internet "publication" of specified 
information requirements  
for importing goods into a Member's territory 
 
3. Notification of Trade Regulations* 
 
4. Establishment of Enquiry Points / SNFP/ 
Information Centers 
Japan, Mongolia and Switzerland. 
 
5. Other Measures to Enhance the Availability 
of Information 
 
B. TIME PERIODS  
BETWEEN PUBLICATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
1. Interval between Publication and Entry into 
Force* 
Hong Kong, China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia and 
Switzerland. 
 
C. CONSULTATION AND 
COMMENTING ON NEW AND 
AMENDED RULES 
 
1. Prior Consultation and Commenting on 
New and Amended Rules  
Hong Kong, China, Japan, Korea, Mongolia and 
Switzerland 
2. Information on Policy Objectives Sought 
 
D. ADVANCE RULINGS 
1. Provision of Advance Rulings 
Australia, Canada and the U.S. 
 
* Some proposals relating to Article XIII. 
 
 
E. APPEAL PROCEDURES 
1. Right of Appeal  
Japan and Mongolia. 
2. Release of Goods in Event of Appeal* 
3. Appeal Mechanism in a Customs Union 
India 
 
F. OTHER MEASURES TO ENHANCE 
IMPARTIALITY,  
NON- DISCRIMINATION AND 
TRANSPARENCY 
1. Uniform Administration of Trade 
Regulations 
 
2. Maintenance and Reinforcement of 
Integrity and Ethical Conduct 
Among Officials 
(a) Establishment of a Code of Conduct 
(b) Computerized System to Reduce/Eliminate 
Discretion 
(c) System of Penalties 
(d) Technical Assistance to Create/Build up 
Capacities to  
Prevent and Control Customs Offences 
(e) Appointment of Staff for Education and 
Training ) 
(f) Coordination and Control Mechanisms 
 
3. Import Alerts/Rapid Alerts 
India. 
 
4. Detention 
India.  
 
5. Test Procedure
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